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IMPOSING JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS ON THE “ART OF
DECEPTION”: THE COURTS CAST A SKEPTICAL EYE ON
COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON RESTORATION EFFORTS

MICHAEL C. BLUMM

*

BY
& HALLISON T. PUTNAM**

In an article published two years ago, one of us made the claim that
the federal agencies in charge of Columbia Basin salmon restoration
efforts were engaged in a widespread practice of deception—attempting
to make it appear to the public that meaningful restoration efforts were
underway when in fact hydropower domination remained the status quo.
That article claimed that the courts would soon inaugurate an era of
active and skeptical review.
That era has unfolded more quickly and more dramatically than we
imagined. In a series of decisions throughout 2007, the Ninth Circuit and
district courts have consistently rejected agency attempts to portray their
cynical efforts to deceive as rational decision making. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit 1) struck down as arbitrary the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) biological opinion on Columbia
Basin hydroelectric operations under the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
2) refused the Bonneville Power Administration’s (BPA) proposed
defunding of the Fish Passage Center, an agency providing critical
information on salmon migration in the Columbia Basin, and 3) rejected
BPA’s failure to fully fund fish and wildlife mitigation measures in its
wholesale electric power rates, as required by the Northwest Power Act.
District courts have followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead concerning
close review, as the Western District of Washington rejected NOAA’s
salmon hatchery policy, which had led to a downlisting of Upper
Columbia steelhead, as inconsistent with the ESA’s preference for wild
salmon. And the District Court of Oregon, which had earlier ruled that
NOAA possessed only limited authority to distinguish between wild and
hatchery salmon, allowed NOAA to treat wild salmon differently than
hatchery salmon after listing. Another judge in the same district
subsequently rejected NOAA’s attempt to delist Oregon Coast coho
salmon as arbitrary.
* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School. We thank Stephanie Parent and Josh
Smith for their comments on a draft of this Article.
** J.D. and Certificate in Environmental and Natural Resources Law, expected 2009, Lewis
and Clark Law School; Member, Environmental Law, 2007–08; B.A. 2002, Amherst College.
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All of these results of 2007 indicate that a new era of close and
skeptical review is underway in the Columbia Basin. The imperiled
salmon runs, which have endured the longstanding deception of the
federal agencies, are surely the better as a result of the courts’
emerging mistrust.
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 48
II. NWF V. NMFS : REJECTING THE DECEPTION OF THE 2004 BIOP .................................... 50
III. RESISTING BPA’S ATTEMPT TO SHOOT THE MESSENGER ................................................. 57
A. Rejecting BPA’s Attempt to Dismantle the FPC ............................................... 61
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C. Trout Unlimited I: Recognizing the ESA’s Goal of Protecting Wild
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D. Alsea II: Deferring to NOAA’s Hatchery Policy ................................................. 79
E. Implications of the District Court Hatchery Salmon Decisions ..................... 80
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 83

“At its core, the 2004 [biological opinion] amounted to little more than an
analytical sleight of hand, manipulating variables to achieve a no jeopardy
finding. Statistically speaking, using [the agency’s] analytical framework, the
dead fish were really alive. The ESA requires a more realistic, common sense
examination.”
—Judge Sidney Runyan Thomas of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 1

I. INTRODUCTION
The Columbia Basin salmon saga, the subject of a lengthy analysis in
this journal two years ago,2 has, as predicted in that article, come under
“active and skeptical judicial review.”3 In this update, we explain several
recent decisions of significance which, while they certainly do not

1 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv. (NWF v. NMFS), 481 F.3d 1224, 1239
(9th Cir. 2007) (discussed infra Part I).
2 Michael C. Blumm, Erica J. Thorson & Joshua D. Smith, Practiced at the Art of Deception:
The Failure of Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery Under the Endangered Species Act, 36 ENVTL.
L. 709 (2006) [hereinafter Practicing Deception]. Unless otherwise indicated, the term “salmon”
includes both Columbia Basin salmon and steelhead (Oncorhynchus mykiss). “While
steelhead . . . is actually a trout, scientists include steelhead among salmonids because it, like
salmon, is an anadromous fish (i.e., migrates from the sea to fresh water to spawn).” Id. at 711
n.1. Native fishers traditionally made no distinction between salmon and steelhead, either. See,
e.g., Native American Rights Fund, Nez Perce Water Rights, JUSTICE NEWSLETTER, Fall, 1997,
http://www.narf.org/pubs/justice/1997fall.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
3 Practicing Deception, supra note 2, at 809.
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guarantee that the agencies entrusted with Columbia Basin salmon
recovery will finally begin to take meaningful steps to turn around the
salmon’s long-term decline,4 will make more difficult the continuation of
the practice of the art of deceiving the public into thinking something
significant is happening when in fact the status quo predominates in
Columbia Basin dam operations.5
These decisions, three from the Ninth Circuit and two from district
courts, have 1) upheld a lower court’s rejection of the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) attempt to comply with the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) in its 2004 biological opinion (BiOp);6 2)
reversed the Bonneville Power Administration’s (BPA) effort to
dismantle the Fish Passage Center, an entity established by the
Northwest Power and Conservation Council to collect data and study
salmon migration in the Columbia;7 3) rejected BPA’s underfunding of
salmon restoration in its latest rate case;8 and 4) determined that NOAA’s
downlisting of Upper Columbia steelhead due to abundant hatchery fish
was inconsistent with the ESA’s preference for wild salmon, thus
apparently disagreeing with the District Court of Oregon on this issue.9
4 Salmon runs in the Columbia Basin, the most hydroelectrically developed river basin in
the world, declined throughout the 20th century and continue to decline in the 21st. Overall,
wild salmon populations are less than 10% of their historic sizes, twelve runs are listed under
the Endangered Species Act, and several more are extinct, due largely to a 55% loss in salmon
habitat and a 31% loss in accessible stream miles. See Northeast-Midwest Institute, Large-Scale
Ecosystem Restoration Initiatives, http://www.nemw.org/columbiariver.htm (last visited Jan. 27,
2008). According to the watchdog group Save Our Wild Salmon, in 2007 “[f]ewer than 67,000
adult spring Chinook” salmon passed Bonneville Dam, the first of eight dams upper basin
salmon must navigate during their upstream migration to Idaho. That was “30% fewer than
[2006] (itself a dismal year), significantly below the 10-year average, and just a fraction of the
400,000-plus fish needed for sustained recovery.” Save Our Wild Salmon, Decline of Wild
Columbia and Snake River Salmon Continues, http://www.wildsalmon.org/library/2007-salmonreturns.cfm (last visited Jan. 27, 2008). Summer chinook returns at Bonneville “registered less
than half of the 2006 count, and only about two-thirds of the 10-year average.” Id.
5 See Practicing Deception, supra note 2, at 806–10. A decade ago, it seemed possible that
the status quo logjam might be broken by breaching the four lower Snake River Dams, but that
proposal was quickly rejected by the Bush Administration, despite favorable scientific and
economic studies. See Michael C. Blumm et al., Saving Snake River Water and Salmon

Simultaneously: The Biological, Economic, and Legal Case for Breaching the Lower Snake River
Dams, Lowering John Day Reservoir, and Restoring Natural River Flows, 28 ENVTL. L. 997 (1998)
[hereinafter Saving Snake Water and Salmon]. In 2006, a group of scientists for the National
Marine Fisheries Services concluded that “[b]arring removal of Snake and Columbia River
dams—a very contentious proposition presently debate[d] in the Pacific Northwest—
restoration of historical migration conditions will not occur.” William D. Muir et al., Post-

Hydropower System Delayed Mortality of Transplanted Snake River Stream-Type Chinook
Salmon: Unraveling the Mystery, 135 TRANSACTIONS OF THE AM. FISHERIES SOC’Y 1523, 1532
(2006).
6

NWF v. NMFS, 481 F.3d at 1233. See discussion infra Part II.

7

Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 477 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2007). See
discussion infra Part III.
8 Golden Nw. Aluminum v. Bonneville Power Admin., 501 F.3d 1037, 1052–53 (9th Cir.
2007). See discussion infra Part IV.
9 See discussion infra Part V.C–E. As this Article went to press, the Oregon District Court
Judge Garr King adopted a federal magistrate’s findings and set aside NOAA’s delisting of the
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This analysis examines each of these cases and explains their
significance.
II. NWF V. NMFS : REJECTING THE DECEPTION OF THE 2004 BIOP
The long-running litigation over Columbia Basin hydrosystem BiOps,
ushered in by the ESA listings of Columbia Basin salmon in the early
1990s,10 continued as the Ninth Circuit resoundingly affirmed Judge James
Redden’s rejection of NOAA’s 2004 BiOp.11 That BiOp was produced under
court order, after NOAA’s 2000 BiOp also failed to survive judicial scrutiny
because it relied on both federal mitigation measures that had not
undergone ESA scrutiny and nonfederal measures that were not
reasonably certain to occur.12 But the 2004 BiOp did not attempt to address
the district court’s call for more scrutiny and more specifics about the
measures that NOAA claimed would avoid jeopardy and thus comply with
the ESA.13 Instead, the new BiOp materially changed its approach to
ascertaining whether annual Columbia Basin hydrosystem operation
produced jeopardy to listed salmon.14 The result was that unlike earlier
BiOps in 1995 and 2000,15 this time NOAA was able to claim that proposed
hydrosystem operations from 2004 until 2014 would not jeopardize listed
salmon.16
Oregon Coast coho (Oncorhynchus kisuch) because of the agency’s failure to make decisions
based on the “best available evidence” as required by the ESA. Trout Unlimited v. Lohn (Trout
Unlimited III ) , No. CV-06-1493-ST, slip op. at 62, 2007 WL 2973568 at *33 (D. Or. Oct. 5, 2007).
See discussion infra note 229.
10 See MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF THE
DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 175, 213–17 (2002) [hereinafter SACRIFICING THE SALMON].
See also Michael C. Blumm, Michael A. Schoessler & R. Christopher Beckwith, Beyond the
Parity Promise: Struggling to Save Columbia Basin Salmon in the Mid-1990s, 27 ENVTL. L. 21, 39,
42, 98 (1997) (discussing the effects of ESA listings of two Columbia Basin salmon species, the
Oregon District Court’s rejection of the 1993 BiOp, and legal challenges to the 1995 BiOp).
11 NWF v. NMFS, 481 F.3d at 1233. Although NMFS has changed its name to NOAA
Fisheries, the court referred to it as NMFS throughout its opinion, since “much of the record
before us uses the prior name.” Id. at 1229 n.1. The lead plaintiff, National Wildlife Federation,
was part of a coalition of some 15 environmental and fishing groups. The state of Oregon
intervened on the side of NWF, and the Nez Perce, Yakama, and other lower Columbia Basin
“Treaty Tribes” submitted an amicus brief in support of NWF’s position. Id. at 1228. The states
of Idaho and Montana, several industrial and farm groups, one golf course, and the Kootenai
Tribe of Idaho intervened on the side of NMFS, which also included the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation as defendants. Id.
12 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1213 (2003); see
also Practicing Deception, supra note 2, at 760–63.
13 Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA requires federal agencies to “insure that any action authorized,
funded, or carried out by [them] . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any
[listed] species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [designated critical]
habitat.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). The Ninth Circuit surveyed some of the details of
complying with this ESA directive in its opinion. NWF v. NMFS, 481 F.3d at 1230–31.
14 The details are discussed in Practicing Deception, supra note 2, at 769–74 (describing
NOAA’s abandoning of the analytic approach the agency employed in previous BiOps).
15 See id. at 738–48, 749–60 (discussing the 1995 and 2000 BiOps, respectively).
16 See NWF v. NMFS, 481 F.3d at 1232.
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The means to this “no jeopardy” end were hardly straightforward,
however. There were no new studies showing that listed salmon
populations were rebounding or that previous appraisals of the
hydrosystem’s toll on those populations were overestimates. Instead,
NOAA made what the Ninth Circuit referred to as “several structural
changes to its jeopardy analysis.”17 The result was that NOAA claimed that
it achieved ESA compliance not through any changes in environmental
conditions, or through improved health of the listed salmon, but through
legal re-definition. It was as if the Bush Administration lawyers had
overrun NOAA’s scientists.
Judge Redden would have none of this, and neither would a unanimous
Ninth Circuit panel. The appeals court affirmed Judge Redden on all
particulars.18 The court affirmed the district court’s rejection of NOAA’s
jeopardy analysis on three grounds. First, the court rejected NOAA’s claim
that the agency possessed much less discretion than it had claimed in the
past to affect Columbia Basin dam operations. The court concluded that
NOAA impermissibly interpreted the ESA jeopardy rule restricting the
application of federal consultation procedures to “any portions of
admittedly-discretionary actions that the agency deems non-discretionary,”
since such an interpretation conflicted with the ESA’s “basic mandate” of
saving listed species.19 NOAA’s claim that there existed competing non-

17
18

Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1233–43. Earlier, the Ninth Circuit had affirmed Judge Redden’s preliminary

injunction granting the plaintiffs’ request for increased river flows and spills of water to
facilitate dam passage, although the court remanded to the district court to determine if the
injunction could be “more narrowly tailored or modified.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 422 F.3d 782, 800 (9th Cir. 2005).
19 NWF v. NMFS, 481 F.3d at 1233–34. The Ninth Circuit cited its own decision in Defenders
of Wildlife v. EPA (Defenders), 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Nat’l Ass’n of
Homebuilders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518 (2007), in reaching this conclusion,
mostly for the propositions that novel interpretations of the ESA’s consultation requirements
were suspect, and that NMFS interpretation of the ESA as applying only to discretionary actions
was unreasonable. Id. at 1234. Subsequently, the Supreme Court overruled Defenders narrowly,
5 to 4, on the latter ground.
On July 19, 2007, the state of Idaho petitioned the Ninth Circuit to rehear NWF v. NMFS en
banc, arguing that “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision in Home Builders has altered markedly the
[three-judge] panel’s legal assumptions concerning the application of section 7(a)(2) to the
FCRPS.” Idaho Petitions Ninth Circuit to Rehear FCRPS BiOp Case, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL.
(Bend, Or.), July 27, 2007, http://www.cbbulletin.com/Archive/07272007/230657.aspx (last
visited Jan. 27, 2008). NMFS, a defendant in NWF v. NMFS, opted against joining Idaho in
seeking reconsideration of the three-judge panel’s decision. Feds Won’t Join Idaho on BiOp
Case Rehearing Request, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL. (Bend, Or.), Aug. 3, 2007,
http://www.cbbulletin.com/Archive/09032007/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2008). En banc
rehearings are generally disfavored and will not be ordered unless 1) en banc consideration is
necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions, or 2) the proceeding
involves a question of exceptional importance. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
Even if the Ninth Circuit agreed to rehear the case, Idaho is unlikely to succeed. Not only
was the discretion issue only one of several grounds on which the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge
Redden’s rejection of NOAA’s jeopardy analysis, but NOAA was unable to articulate a
reasonable statutory conflict between the ESA and other Columbia Basin dam statutes. And
there are at least two such statutes—the Northwest Power Act, Pacific Northwest Power
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discretionary directives for flood control, irrigation, and power production
was unpersuasive, as the court noted that NOAA acknowledged that
Congress had never quantified any of these allegedly immutable obligations,
leaving considerable agency discretion as to how to fulfill them.20 Thus, the
court forbade NOAA from excluding so-called non-discretionary actions
from ESA scrutiny under the jeopardy analysis, noting that “ESA compliance
is not optional,” and “[t]he very fact that the agencies are unable to define
the limits of their discretion here reveals that all [Columbia Basin dam]
operations are intertwined and subject to discretionary control.”21
The second flaw in NOAA’s jeopardy analysis concerned the agency’s
failure to include degraded baseline conditions.22 NOAA’s jeopardy analysis
of the effects of proposed dam operations in the 2004 BiOp was unlike that
Planning and Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 839a–839h (2000), discussed in NWF v. NMFS, 481
F.3d at 1235, and the River and Harbors Act of 1945, 33 U.S.C. §§ 603a, 544b (2000) (promising
adequate measures for naturally spawning salmon), discussed in SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra
note 10, at 97—which expressly direct Columbia Basin dam operating agencies to protect
migrating salmon. The existence of these complementary directives seems to make the
Defenders decision distinguishable from the Columbia Basin situation. Even if these statutory
directives do not sufficiently distinguish Defenders, since the Ninth Circuit had two other
grounds for affirming on jeopardy analysis grounds, as well as a critical habitat ground,
Defenders should have no practical affect on the result in NWF v. NMFS.
In any event, a reversal of the Ninth Circuit panel’s decision will have little practical effect
as NOAA’s revised biological opinion was due October 31, 2007, after this article went to press,
and the federal action agencies indicated that they abandoned the 2004 BiOp’s analytical
framework and are returning to the approach of the 2000 BiOp. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS,
BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN. & U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY TO BIOLOGICAL
ASSESSMENT FOR COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND
MAINSTEM EFFECTS OF UPPER SNAKE AND OTHER TRIBUTARY ACTIONS 2–5 (2007), available at
http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/biological_opinions/fcrps/ba-ca/index.cfm [hereinafter 2007 BA
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY] (“The agencies have generally returned to the approach used in the 2000
BiOp . . . [T]he analysis of the action makes no distinction between discretionary and nondiscretionary actions . . . .”). Of course, the 2000 BiOp failed to survive judicial review, see
Practicing Deception, supra note 2, at 760–63, and it is hardly clear how the federal agencies
will ensure that their promised mitigation will be “reasonably certain” to occur.
Of course, rather than comply with the law or seek to amend the ESA, the Bush
Administration may take a different course—by changing the regulations implementing the
ESA. In late March 2007, two environmental groups obtained a leaked draft of a U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service proposal to alter dozens of regulations governing the ESA. See Jodi Peterson,
An Endangered Endangered Species Act?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 16, 2007, at 6. One of the
proposed rewrites seems to be a direct response to Judge Redden’s rulings on the Federal
Columbia River Power System (FCRPS). If the Bush Administration has its way, the
“environmental baseline” would be “the reference condition representing the status of the
species and the environmental conditions existing at the time the Agency requests
consultation . . . . The environmental baseline does include the effects of the non-discretionary
portion of the action under consultation.” Id. The proposed change to the regulatory definition
of the environmental baseline would effectively overrule Judge Redden’s holding that the
federal defendants may not exclude the existence and operations of the FCRPS from the scope
of the consultation. Id.
20 NWF v. NMFS, 481 F.3d at 1234–35.
21 Id. at 1235. The court also observed that “[t]he so-called ‘non-discretionary’ operations
might also qualify as ‘interrelated’ actions, which must be considered in the jeopardy analysis”
under the ESA regulations. Id. at 1235 n.7 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 402.02).
22 Id. at 1235–36.
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in its earlier BiOps because the agency employed a new, so-called
“comparative approach,” under which environmental baseline conditions in
the Columbia River and tributaries were essentially discounted: instead of
considering the effect of proposed operations in combination with
environmental baseline conditions and cumulative effects (the so-called
“aggregation approach” that NOAA previously employed), NOAA now would
find jeopardy only if the proposal would produce “appreciably worse”
effects than baseline conditions.23 According to the Ninth Circuit, this
redefinition of jeopardy would allow NOAA’s analysis to take place “in a
vacuum,” allowing species to be “gradually destroyed, so long as each step
on the path to destruction is sufficiently modest.”24 The court thought “[t]his
type of slow slide into oblivion” was impermissible under the ESA, and was
in fact “one of the very ills the ESA seeks to prevent.”25 Because the ESA
demanded a contextual analysis of the effects of the agency proposal in light
of the current environmental conditions affecting listed species, the court
rejected NOAA’s artificial, unconnected redefinition of jeopardy.26
A third shortcoming in the BiOp’s jeopardy analysis was its failure to
consider recovery.27 The court gave no deference to NOAA’s interpretation
of the jeopardy regulation that an agency need only consider the effects on
species survival, not its recovery, when determining if a proposal violated
the statutory standard of “likely to jeopardize the continued existence of” a
listed species.28 The court thought that reading “recovery” out of the text in
this fashion was inconsistent with the plain language of the regulation,29
with NOAA’s prior interpretation and application,30 and with the regulatory
background of the regulation.31 As in an earlier decision ruling that the ESA
required the listing agency to consider recovery as well as survival of the

23
24
25

Id.
Id. at 1235.
Id. The court rejected NOAA’s claim that the “aggregation approach” the agency formerly

used would have the effect of preventing all proposed actions once background conditions
placed a species in jeopardy, explaining that only those actions which caused further species
deterioration would be forbidden. Id. at 1235–36. According to the court, the ESA bans all
actions that would “tip a species from a state of precarious survival into a state of likely
extinction.” Id. at 1236.
26 Id. at 1235 (noting that the ESA requires NOAA to consider proposed dam operations “in
their actual context”).
27 Id. at 1236–38.
28 Endangered Species Act (ESA) of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000). The ESA
regulations interpret this directive to prohibit any agency action “that reasonably would be
expected, directly or indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and
recovery of a listed species in the wild.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2008).
29 NWF v. NMFS, 481 F.3d at 1237 (“NMFS’s reading of the jeopardy regulation inexplicably
reads ‘and recovery’ out of the text.”). See supra note 28 for the text of the regulation.
30 Id. at 1237–38 (“Until issuing the 2004 BiOp, the agency had consistently interpreted [the
jeopardy regulation, supra note 28,] as requiring a joint analysis of both survival and recovery
impacts.”).
31 Id. at 1238 (discussing comments on 1986 revisions to the regulation, emphasizing that
“‘in exceptional circumstances,’ injury to recovery prospects alone could result in a jeopardy
finding” (quoting 51 Fed. Reg. 19,934 (June 3, 1986))).
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species in evaluating adverse modification of critical habitat,32 the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the jeopardy regulation also required ascertaining
both survival and recovery effects.33 Given the “highly precarious” status of
Columbia Basin salmon, the court determined that there was a “substantial
possibility” that requiring NOAA to evaluate recovery prospects could
change the jeopardy analysis.34
Thus, the exclusion of allegedly non-discretionary actions, baseline
conditions, and recovery prospects from NOAA’s jeopardy analysis
constituted independent grounds for striking down the 2004 BiOp. The court
concluded that the BiOp “[a]t its core amounted to . . . little more than an
analytical slight of hand, manipulating the variables to achieve a ‘no
jeopardy’ finding.”35 Somewhat astonished, the court continued,
“[s]tatistically speaking, using the 2004 BiOp’s analytic framework, the dead
fish were really alive.”36 But this “Alice in Wonderland” world the BiOp
attempted to create would not stand, for, as the court concluded, “[t]he ESA
requires a more realistic, common sense examination.”37
The flawed jeopardy analysis was not the only grounds for striking
down the 2004 BiOp. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Judge Redden that
NOAA’s failure to ensure that proposed hydrosystem operations would avoid
adversely modifying designated critical habitat for several listed Snake River
salmon species was arbitrary and capricious.38 NOAA’s response to the
Ninth Circuit’s earlier decision requiring consideration of both species
survival and recovery in deciding whether a proposed action would
adversely affect critical habitat39 was, according to the court, inadequate.40
NOAA acknowledged that proposed hydrosystem operations would produce
negative effects on “the essential habitat feature of safe passage in the
juvenile migration corridor” for five years, but claimed that over the ensuing
five years, long-term improvements in fish passage, such as installation of
removable spillway weirs, would offset the short-term adverse effects.41
32

Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir.

2004).
33
34

NWF v. NMFS, 481 F.3d at 1237.
Id. at 1238. Although the court did not conclude that Columbia Basin salmon recovery

risks merited a jeopardy finding, it did note that the fact that Snake River sockeye is almost
wholly dependent on hatchery programs “may seriously harm its chances of recovery.” Id. at
n.11.
35 Id. at 1239.
36

Id.
Id. The Ninth Circuit therefore determined that Judge Redden’s rejection of the BiOp’s
jeopardy analysis was “entirely correct.” Id.
38 Id. at 1239–41. Only the Snake River species had designated critical habitat at the time of
37

the suit, the others having been withdrawn as a result of a settlement to which NOAA agreed.
See id. at 1239 & n.12.
39 Gifford Pinchot Task Force, 378 F.3d 1059, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004).
40 NWF v. NMFS, 481 F.3d at 1239–41.
41 See id. at 1240–41. The quote in the text concerned Snake River spring/summer chinook;
with respect to Snake River sockeye, NOAA found that the proposed dam operations would
produce “significant impairment” of safe passage. See id. at 1240. Removable spillway weirs are
immense structures—approximately 105 feet tall, 70 feet wide, and 1.7 million pounds—
installed on the surface of a dam’s reservoir, which allow juvenile salmon to pass through dams
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Discounting short-term effects while emphasizing long-term improvements
had already been found wanting twice by the Ninth Circuit,42 so it was no
surprise that it failed here as well, especially since NOAA had no “specific
and binding” plans concerning spillway weirs and no idea what level of inriver juvenile salmon survival was necessary for recovery.43
Finally, the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s authority to issue
injunctive relief that it specified in its October 2005 remand order, which
required NOAA to produce a “failure report” to the court whenever the
agency believes that the proposed action will not avoid jeopardy.44 Perhaps
because dam breaching was among the alternative measures the court
directed NOAA to consider in such a “failure report,”45 NOAA challenged the
remand order as beyond the court’s authority.46 NOAA also challenged the
court’s authority to direct the agency to collaborate with the states and the
tribes on a revised BiOp and in resolving policy and scientific differences.47
The Ninth Circuit affirmed on both counts, finding “failure report” to be “a
reasonable combination of a time limit and progress reports and . . .
appropriate under the circumstances of this case.”48 The collaboration
requirement was consistent with the ESA’s command that agencies use “best
scientific and commercial data available”49 and a “reasonable procedural
restriction given the history of this litigation.”50

near the water’s surface, thus avoiding turbine passage. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, Walla Walla
Dist., Spillway Weir Fact Sheet, http://www.nww.usace.army.mil/spillway_weir/SW_
FctShtMay05.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2008). For further discussion of the use of removable
spillway weirs and their use in promoting juvenile salmon passage, see Practicing Deception,
supra note 2, at 753 n.256.
42 Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Associations v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 426 F.3d
1082, 1092–95 (9th Cir. 2005); Gifford Pinchot Task Force, 378 F.3 at 1069.
43 NWF v. NMFS, 481 F.3d at 1241 (stating that the record showed “[no] clear, definite
commitment of resources for future improvements”). The court also concluded that “[r]equiring
some attention to recovery issues does not improperly import the ESA’s separate recovery
planning into the section 7 consultation process.” Id.
44 Id. at 1242. The remand order stipulated:
If, at any time during the remand period, NOAA concludes that the Action Agencies are
not making sufficient progress in developing a proposed action and/or RPA [reasonable
prudent alternative] that avoids jeopardy to the listed species, NOAA shall advise the
court of that circumstance immediately and shall issue a ‘‘failure report’’ similar to that
required in the 2000 BiOp that advises the court and the parties of those additional
measures, including the breaching of the dams that may be necessary to achieve a valid
no-jeopardy finding.

Id.
45
46

See id. On the dam breaching option, see Saving Snake Water and Salmon, supra note 5.
NWF v. NMFS, 481 F.3d at 1241–42. NOAA did not challenge the provision in the remand

order that called for regular status reports every 90 days during the remand. Nor did the agency
contest the court’s authority to impose a deadline on the remand proceedings. Id.
47

Id.
Id. The court noted that district courts have “broad latitude in fashioning equitable relief
when necessary to remedy an established wrong.” Id. (quoting Alaska Ctr. for the Env’t v.
48

Browner, 20 F.3d 981, 986 (9th Cir. 1994)).
49 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2000).
50 NWF v. NMFS, 481 F.3d at 1242.
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Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s decision represented a complete affirmation of
Judge Redden’s decision and the injunctive relief he ordered. It is certainly
possible that the district court has instituted a procedure that will produce
substantial improvements in the condition of the listed Columbia Basin
salmon.51 But the history suggests that optimism is not warranted.52 Since

51 In October 2005, Judge Redden remanded the 2004 BiOp to NOAA, instructing the
agencies to correct: 1) the 2004 BiOp’s improper distinction between discretionary and nondiscretionary actions, 2) its improper comparison, rather than aggregation, of the effects of the
proposed action and the environmental baseline, 3) its flawed critical habitat analysis, 4) the
BiOp’s failure to consider the species’ prospects for recovery, and 5) the agencies’ past reliance
on mitigation measures that were not reasonably certain to occur, or which had not yet
undergone section 7 consultation. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01640-RE, 2005 WL 2488447, at *5 (D. Or. Oct. 7, 2005). The judge ordered the federal defendants
to prepare detailed quarterly status reports for the court and the parties. He also required the
federal agencies to meet regularly with the states and the tribes for the purposes of developing
a proposed action and narrowing policy, scientific, and technical disagreements. Id.
Nearly two years, six status conferences, and innumerable technical and scientific meetings
later, the federal action agencies (the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Bonneville Power
Administration, and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation) released a Biological Assessment (BA) and
a Comprehensive Analysis (CA) for the FCRPS and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s Upper
Snake River Projects on September 6, 2007. See U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, BONNEVILLE POWER
ADMIN. & U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL COLUMBIA
RIVER POWER SYSTEM AND MAINSTEM EFFECTS OF UPPER SNAKE AND OTHER TRIBUTARY ACTIONS
(2007), available at http://www.salmonrecovery.gov/Biological_Opinions/FCRPS/BA-CA/CA/CAFinal.pdf; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BIOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT FOR BUREAU OF RECLAMATION
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE IN THE SNAKE RIVER BASIN ABOVE BROWNLEE RESERVOIR (2007),
available at http://www.usbr.gov/pn/programs/UpperSnake/2007ba/2007usba.pdf. The BA
includes descriptions of the Action Agencies’ Proposed Actions (PA) in the Columbia and Snake
Rivers. The CA integrates the effects of the FCRPS and the Upper Snake River Projects to
conduct qualitative and quantitative biological analyses for each endangered or threatened
species. NOAA Fisheries will now conduct its own biological analyses based on the federal
action agencies’ PAs and BAs, and then produce a biological opinion to determine whether the
PAs jeopardize the listed species. A revised draft Biological Opinion was due October 31, 2007.
Although the federal action agencies hailed the new plan as the “most comprehensive
approach ever” to revive protected salmon and steelhead, environmentalists maintain that the
new strategy simply protects the status quo, charging that the federal agencies continue to
refuse to consider any changes to hydrosystem operations beyond minor tweaks. Feds Release
New Columbia Basin Salmon Recovery Strategy, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL. (Bend, Or.) July 27,
2007, http://www.cbbulletin.com/Archive/09072007/236175.aspx (last visited Jan. 27, 2008)
[hereinafter Feds Release New Strategy ]. Indeed, the federal defendants claim there are “very
little—very few benefits [that] can be obtained from new hydro operations, either structural
modifications or operational changes.” Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No.
CV 01-640-RE, Transcript of Status Conference Proceedings, at 8–9 (D.Or. June 20, 2007).
Because the existence and operation of the FCRPS alone is likely to result in a jeopardy finding
for all Columbia and Snake River stocks, the proposed action focuses on improvements in
estuary habitat, predator management, and hatchery management. Id.; 2007 BA EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 3. One problem with the federal defendants’ focus on habitat,
hatcheries, and predation is that such measures are unlikely to produce any tangible results for
several years. Feds Release New Strategy, supra.
52 For example, a draft PA submitted by NMFS in June 2007 seemed to revive the off-site
mitigation approach that the 2000 BiOp employed, and that Judge Redden found wanting,
because implementation of the promised measures was not reasonably certain to occur. See
supra note 12 and accompanying text. The proposal also called for reductions in spill and flows
and increased reliance on artificial transport of juvenile salmon downstream, shopworn
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the ESA listings over fifteen years ago, precious little has changed in terms
of the way Columbia Basin dams are operated.53 True, the success of the
NWF v. NMFS litigation has curbed the ability of NOAA and federal agencies
operating the hydrosystem to define away by “analytical sleight of hand”54
the ESA’s potential to restore Columbia Basin salmon. But in a larger sense,
NOAA and the other federal agencies mostly achieved their purpose in the
2004 BiOp and the ensuing litigation: they bought more time to maintain a
deadly status quo, a status quo in which hydropower operations continue to
dominate salmon restoration through administrative discretion.55 Salmon
advocates who have been calling for substantial changes in Columbia Basin
dam operations for some three decades must acknowledge this unsettling
reality.
III. RESISTING BPA’S ATTEMPT TO SHOOT THE MESSENGER
The Northwest Power and Conservation Planning Council (Council)
established the predecessor of the Fish Passage Center (FPC) in 1982 to help
fulfill the Northwest Power Act’s dual goals of protecting and enhancing
Columbia Basin fish and wildlife, while also assuring the Pacific Northwest
an adequate, efficient, economical, and reliable power supply.56 Under the

suggestions that have failed in the past. See Ed Chaney, Sudden Death Overtime for Wild Snake
River Basin Salmon and Steelhead, FLYFISHER, Summer 2007, at 21, 25, available at
www.nwric.org/reports/TroubleOnTheSnakePartIVlowres.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2008).
Also worth noting is that it appears likely that the BiOp will be based, at least in part, on a
controversial new biological metrics analysis authored by D. Robert Lohn, Regional
Administrator of NOAA Fisheries. See 2007 BA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 3-1 to 3-8.
The so-called Lohn Metrics Memo suggests that the recovery prong of the jeopardy analysis
would be satisfied if the species is found to be “trending towards recovery, within a reasonable
time.” Practicing Deception, supra note 2, at 768 n.343. In other words, so long as a particular
species has a population growth ratio greater than one to one, a proposed action would not
jeopardize the species’ path to recovery. The Metrics Memo also suggests that mitigation
measures will be sufficient to avoid jeopardy if they can be “reasonably expected to accrue”
within “a reasonable period of time.” 2007 BA EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 19, at 3. Aside
from the obvious uncertainty of such a standard, several parties have argued that a slightly
positive population growth rate is not equivalent of a trend toward recovery, given the current
imperiled status of the species. See Practicing Deception, supra note 2, at 798 n.492. Although
Judge Redden has been reluctant in the past to question whether NOAA Fisheries is using the
“best available science” in determining jeopardy, such an inquiry may be inevitable.
53 On the ineffectiveness of the ESA, see Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and
the ESA: Lessons From the Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REV. 519 (1999).
54 See supra text accompanying notes 1, 35 (quoting the Ninth Circuit).
55 See generally Chaney, supra note 52 (providing a brief overview of hydropower’s
dominance of the Columbia Basin).
56 See 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(1)(A) (2000). The predecessor to the FPC, called the Water
Budget Center, oversaw the annual water budget, which the Council adopted as part of its Fish
and Wildlife Program. NW. POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE
PROGRAM §§ 302–04 (1982). For a description and history of the Water Budget, see Michael C.
Blumm, Reexamining the Parity Promise: More Challenges than successes of the Columbia
Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L. 461, 469–71 (1986); Michael C. Blumm & Andy
Simrin, The Unraveling of the Parity Promise: Hydropower, Salmon, and Endangered Species in
the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL. L. 657, 674–79 (1991).
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Council’s program, the FPC, which collects and analyzes scientific data on
salmon survival in the Columbia Basin,57 receives funding from the
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA),58 a situation producing
considerable institutional conflict.59
In 2005, in what must be the paradigmatic example of how important
control over scientific information is to those who operate Columbia Basin
dams, the FPC became embroiled in a controversy that might seem unusual
for an agency whose charter is simply to gather and disseminate scientific
information.60 In June 2005, in the BiOp litigation described in section I,
Judge Redden issued an injunction requiring federal hydrosystem operators
to spill water over the Lower Snake River and McNary Dams during the late
spring and summer of 2005.61 That fall, the FPC issued a preliminary study
57 See NW. POWER & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, MAINSTEM AMENDMENTS TO THE COLUMBIA
RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, 27–28 (2003) [hereinafter Council’s 2003 Fish and
Wildlife Program], available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/2003/2003-11.pdf (stating the
Center “shall conduct” smolt monitoring and gather and analyze information related to fish
passage).
58 The current Fish and Wildlife Program continues the operation of the FPC. See id. BPA, a
federal agency, sells and transmits wholesale electricity from 31 federal hydroelectric plants,
one non-federal nuclear power plant, and other non-federal power plants in the Columbia River
Basin. See BONNEVILLE POWER ADMIN., BPA FAST FACTS 1 (2006), available at
http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/about_BPA/Facts/FactDocs/BPA_Facts_2006.pdf. The Northwest
Power Act requires BPA to use the revenues from electricity sales to protect, mitigate and
enhance fish and wildlife “in a manner consistent with . . . the [Fish and Wildlife] [P]rogram
adopted by the Council.” 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (2000).
59 For an overview, see Practicing Deception, supra note 2, at 798–802. See also NIC LANE &
ADAM VANN, THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN’S FISH PASSAGE CENTER, at CRS-3 (Cong. Research Serv.,
Report for Congress RS 22414, Feb. 23, 2007), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/
CRSreports/07March/RS22414.pdf.
60 The Council’s 1987 amendments to the Fish and Wildlife Program called for the creation
of a Fish Passage Center to monitor salmon migration through the Federal Columbia River
Power System, oversee dissolved gas programs, and report on comparative fish survival. NW.
POWER PLANNING COUNCIL, 1987 COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM § 303(b), at
57 (1987). The FPC’s functions have expanded to include assisting in formulating flow and spill
recommendations and providing data and analysis to federal hydrosystem operators, state
agencies, and tribes. See Council’s 2003 Fish and Wildlife Program, supra note 57, at 27–28,
calling for the Fish Passage Center to:

1) Plan and implement the annual smolt monitoring program; 2) Gather, organize,
analyze, house, and make widely available monitoring and research information related
to juvenile and adult passage, and to the implementation of the water management and
passage measures that are part of the Council’s program; 3) Provide technical
information necessary to assist the agencies and tribes in formulating in-season flow and
spill requests that implement the water management measures in the Council’s program,
while also assisting the agencies and tribes in making sure that operating criteria for
storage reservoirs are satisfied; and 4) In general, provide the technical assistance
necessary to coordinate recommendations for storage reservoir and river operations
that, to the extent possible, avoid potential conflicts between anadromous and resident
fish.

See also Fish Passage Center, FPC HomePage, http://www.fpc.org/fpc_homepage.html (last
visited Jan. 27, 2008) (providing more information on the FPC); Elizabeth Rusch, Swimming
Upstream, PORTLAND MONTHLY, Sept. 2007, at 121.
61

Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-640-RE, CV 05-23-RE, 2005
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assessing the effects of the court-ordered spill on juvenile salmon survival in
the Columbia Basin, suggesting that the court-ordered spill resulted in the
highest levels of salmon survival recorded in recent years.62 Judge Redden
proceeded to rely on the 2005 FPC study when he issued another injunction
calling for spills during the spring and summer of 2006.63 The judge declared
that “[t]he [FPC]’s expertise at gathering such useful data must be replicated
for the spring of 2006 and beyond. Only with such data can the relative
benefits of spill and/or transportation be determined.”64
The effect the FPC’s preliminary study had on Judge Redden did not go
unnoticed by members of Congress. In late 2005, Senator Larry Craig (RIdaho)—the 2002 National Hydropower Association’s legislator of the year 65
and a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee—inserted language
into the Conference Report on the 2006 Senate Energy and Water
Appropriations bill, aiming to eliminate funding for the FPC.66 The language
WL 1398223, at *5 (D.Or. June 10, 2005). See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing
the Ninth Circuit’s upholding of Judge Redden’s June 2005 injunction). See also Practicing
Deception, supra note 2, at 794–97 (discussing the Redden decision).
62 See Fish Passage Center Offers Preliminary Analysis on Spill, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL.,
(Bend, Or.) Sept. 16, 2005 (on file with author). The FPC conducted the 2005 study at the
request of the Fish Passage Center Oversight Board, which the Council established as part of its
2000 Fish and Wildlife Program to oversee the operations of the FPC. Nw. POWER PLANNING
COUNCIL, COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 28 (2000), available at
http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/2000/2000-19/Default.htm.
63 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. CV 01-640-RE, 2005 WL 3576843, at
*8 (D. Or. Dec. 29, 2005) (“The most recent information on the benefits of summer spill came
from the [FPC]’s count of fish that survived the 2005 summer migration, which involved courtordered spill. The [FPC]’s count showed that more spill improved the survival rate of salmon
passing the dams compared to previous years.”).
64

Id.

65

Press Release, National Hydropower Association, Craig Receives Legislator of the Year
Award (Apr. 23, 2002) (on file with author). See Blaine Harden, Zeroing Out the Messenger,
WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2005, at A21, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/11/29/AR2005112901288.html. The National Hydropower Association is
a non-profit organization dedicated to advancing the interests of the U.S. hydropower industry.
For more information, see the National Hydropower Association website, http://www.hydro.org
(last visited Jan. 27, 2008). Senator Craig subsequently encountered political difficulties that
jeopardize his role as a hydropower defender. See, e.g., Erika Bolstad & Rocky Barker, Craig
Launches Drive to Save His Job; Ethics Panel Refuses to Call Off Complaint, IDAHO STATESMAN,
Sept. 5, 2007, available at http://www.idahostatesman.com/larrycraig/story/150661.html.
66 See S. REP. NO. 109-84, at 178–79 (2006):
The Committee is concerned about the increasing cost of salmon recovery efforts in the
Columbia River Basin, and about the potential adverse impact of those increased costs
on customers of the Bonneville Power Administration. The Committee also is concerned
about the quality and efficiency of some of the fish data collection efforts and analyses
being performed. As a result, during fiscal year 2006, the Bonneville Power
Administration may make no new obligations from the Bonneville Power Administration
Fund in support of the Fish Passage Center. The Committee understands that there are
universities in the Pacific Northwest that already collect fish data for the region and are
well-positioned to take on the responsibilities now being performed by the Fish Passage
Center, and that the universities can carry out those responsibilities at a savings to the
region’s ratepayers that fund these programs.
Senator Craig introduced this language with the alleged purpose of protecting the Pacific
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suggested that the FPC should be defunded and its functions transferred.67
But the final version of the energy bill made no reference at all to the FPC.68
Nonetheless, BPA assumed that the language in the conference report
required the agency to cease funding the FPC. Consequently, just a few
weeks after Congress passed the appropriations bill, BPA proceeded to
release a “Program Solicitation – Request for Applications” (Program
Solicitation), soliciting replacement agencies for the FPC.69
A coalition of environmentalists and sport-fishery advocates, led by the
Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC), challenged BPA’s
decision to transfer the functions of the FPC to two new entities.70 NEDC

Northwest’s economy, allegedly harmed by the cost of the FPC’s studies, which Craig deemed
redundant. See Blaine Harden, Senator Aims to Kill Agency That Tracks Salmon, WASH. POST,
June 24, 2005, at A11, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2005/06/23/AR2005062301915.html (quoting Sid Smith, a spokesperson for Sen. Craig: “[p]ower
rates are going up, [and] we think ratepayers ought to have some answers for how their money
is being spent”). Craig’s justification hardly seemed persuasive, considering that the FPC had
only 12 employees and an annual budget that amounted to less than one percent of BPA’s
budget for fish and wildlife mitigation programs. See Harden, supra note 65. See also Senate
Panel Orders BPA to Cease Fish Passage Center Funding, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., (Bend, Or.),
July 1, 2005 (“BPA . . . spends about $139 million a year to fund more than 300 fish and wildlife
mitigation projects. The FPC’s budget for FY 2005 was $1.3 million”). A number of regional
experts on salmon recovery have argued that “[e]liminating or reducing funding for the [FPC]
will actually increase salmon recovery costs, as the states and tribes will need additional staff to
replace the lost functions.” Harden, supra note 65 (quoting Jeffrey P. Koenings, Director of the
Washington Fish and Wildlife Department).
Senator Craig claimed that “other institutions” in the Northwest were capable of doing most
of the FPC’s work, maintaining that dismantling the agency would reduce duplicative work and
increase efficiency. Id. But in 2000, the Independent Scientific Review Panel for the Northwest
Power Planning Council concluded that there was little duplication between the FPC and other
organizations. INDEP. SCIENTIFIC REVIEW PANEL FOR THE NW. PLANNING COUNCIL, REVIEW OF
DATABASES FUNDED THROUGH THE COLUMBIA RIVER BASIN FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM 5 (2003),
available at http://www.nwcouncil.org/library/isrp/isrp2000-3.pdf (noting the potential for
duplication but stating that “multiple data centers do not necessarily represent either
duplication or inefficiency”). See also Redden Says Will Order Remand While 2004 BiOp Stays in
Place, COLUMBIA BASIN BULL., (Bend, Or.), Oct. 3, 2005.
67 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-275, at 174 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1065, 1125 (“The
conferees call upon [BPA] and the [Council] to ensure that an orderly transfer of the [FPC]
functions . . . occurs within 120 days of enactment of this legislation. These functions shall be
transferred to other existing and capable entities in the region in a manner that ensures
seamless continuity of activities.”).
68 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-103, 119 Stat.
2247, 2276 (2005).
69 BPA, INTEGRATED FISH AND WILDLIFE PROGRAM, PROGRAM SOLICITATION – REQUEST FOR
APPLICATIONS 1 (2005), available at http://www.efw.bpa.gov/IntegratedFWP/RequestFor
Applications.pdf (“Congress passed legislation (House Report 109-275), which forbids BPA from
making additional obligations in support of the [FPC].”); Peter Sleeth, Groups Seek Aid for Fish
Center, OREGONIAN, Jan. 24, 2006, at B5 (quoting BPA spokesperson Mike Hansen as saying,
“[w]e have basically been instructed by Congress to stop funding the [FPC]”).
70 Petition for Review, NEDC v. BPA (NEDC), 477 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-70430)
(filed Jan. 21, 2006), available at http://www.peaclaw.org/objects/BPA_final_petition.pdf. NEDC
was joined by co-petitioners Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility and the
Northwest Sportfishing Industry Association. Id. NEDC filed an amended petition for review on
February 6, 2006. Amended Petition for Review, NEDC, 477 F.3d 668 (No. 06-70430) (filed Jan.
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charged that the transfer was a violation of BPA’s duty to act consistent with
the Council’s Fish and Wildlife Program, which called for the continued
operation of the FPC.71 NEDC claimed that BPA’s withdrawal of funding for
the FPC also violated the Northwest Power Act,72 which requires BPA to use
its funding to “protect, mitigate and enhance fish and wildlife . . . in a manner
consistent with” the Fish and Wildlife Program.73
Nonetheless, BPA proceeded. In early 2006, the agency announced that
it had selected two entities to replace the FPC: Battelle Pacific Northwest
Laboratory (Battelle) and Pacific States Marine Fisheries Commission
(Pacific States).74 Shortly thereafter BPA offered contracts to Battelle and
Pacific States. NEDC filed suit, and the Ninth Circuit granted temporary
injunctive relief, requiring BPA to continue to fund the FPC, pending the
court’s review of BPA’s actions.75

A. Rejecting BPA’s Attempt to Dismantle the FPC
In January 2007, the Ninth Circuit decided that BPA acted unlawfully
when it decided to eliminate the FPC’s funding.76 The court reasoned that
21, 2006). The Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation filed a similar petition for
review on March 3, 2006. Petition for Review, Confederated Tribes of the Yakama Indian Nation
v. BPA, 477 F.3d 668 (No. 06-71182) (filed Mar. 6, 2006). The Ninth Circuit consolidated these
petitions. Consolidation, NEDC, 477 F.3d 668 (Nos. 06-70430, 06-71182) (filed Apr. 7, 2006). The
Council intervened on behalf of the petitioners. Brief of Intervenor, NEDC, 477 F.3d 668 (Nos.
06-70430, 06-71182).
71 The 2003 Mainstem Amendments to the Fish and Wildlife Program, which are currently in
force, expressly call for “the continued operation of the Fish Passage Center.” Council’s 2003
Fish and Wildlife Program, supra note 57, at 27.
72 Petition for Review, NEDC, 477 F.3d 668 (No. 06-70430).
73 16 U.S.C. § 839(b)(h)(10)(A) (2000). Under the Northwest Power Act, the Council must
adopt a program to protect, mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife (the Fish and Wildlife
Program). Id. § 839(b)(h)(1)(A) (2000). The statute requires BPA to use its funding to protect,
mitigate, and enhance fish and wildlife “in a manner consistent with . . . the program adopted by
the Council.” Id. § 839(b)(h)(10)(A) (2000). In its brief to the Ninth Circuit, the Council argued
that a “key question” for the court was its interpretation of the Act’s consistency provision, for it
went “to the heart” of the “ability of the Council to see its extensive fish and wildlife mitigation
program implemented in the manner intended by Congress.” Brief of Intervenor Nw. Power &
Conservation Council, NEDC, 477 F.3d 668 (Nos. 06-70430, 06-71182) (filed June 10, 2006).
“[F]or Bonneville to act ‘in a manner consistent with’ the Council[’s] [Fish and Wildlife]
[P]rogram requires . . . [a] high substantive standard of adherence and agreement to the
Council’s [Fish and Wildlife] [P]rogram.” Id. at *35.
74 Press Release, Bonneville Power Admin., BPA Selects Successors to Fish Passage Center
(Jan. 26, 2006), http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/BPAnews/2005/NewsRelease.cfm?ReleaseNo=695
(last visited Jan. 27, 2008). Under BPA’s proposed plan, Pacific States would “[m]anage the
smolt monitoring program,” “[p]erform functions associated with related data collection and
management,” and “[c]onduct routine analysis and reporting of that data,” while Battelle would
“oversee, coordinate, and facilitate broader, non-routine scientific analysis of that data,
including independent peer review.” Id.
75 Order, NEDC, 477 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-70430) (filed on Mar. 17, 2006); see Bill
Rudolph, Fish Passage Center Gets Contract Extension Through November, NW. FISHLETTER
NO. 213, Apr. 18, 2006 (explaining that the injunction assured BPA would not close the FPC at
the end of March, as it had planned).
76 NEDC, 477 F.3d at 691. The Northwest Power Act gives the Ninth Circuit exclusive
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BPA had violated both the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Article I
of the Constitution.77

1. Unlawfully Relying on Legislative History
The Ninth Circuit agreed with NEDC that BPA violated the APA and
Article I of the Constitution by transferring the functions of the FPC on the
basis of mere legislative history.78 The court gave two reasons for its
decision: 1) the language in the committee report on which BPA relied was
not connected to any text in the statute,79 and 2) if courts were to allow such
legislative history to become law, it would pervert the process for creating
legally binding action—which, under Article I of the Constitution, requires
both bicameralism and presentment.80 Thus, without statutory support,81 the
language in the committee report referring to the FPC was insufficient to
require BPA to transfer the functions of the FPC because “legislative history,
untethered to text in an enacted statute, has no compulsive legal effect.”82
The court also decided that by giving binding effect to legislative
history, BPA had “frustrated the statutory design of the Northwest Power
jurisdiction over challenges to “final actions and decisions taken pursuant to [the Northwest
Power Act] . . . by the Administrator [of BPA] or the Council, or the implementation of such
final actions.” 16 U.S.C. § 839(f)(e)(5) (2000). BPA raised two challenges to the Ninth Circuit’s
subject matter jurisdiction, both of which were rejected by the court. NEDC, 477 F.3d at 678–79,
681.
77 Id. at 691.
78 Id. at 682–85.
79 Id. at 682. “[C]ourts have no authority to enforce [a] principl[e] gleaned solely from
legislative history that has no statutory reference point.” Id. at 683 (second and third alterations
in original) (quoting Shannon v. United States, 512 U.S. 573, 584 (1994)). In many respects, this
result is hardly a surprise in light of the Supreme Court’s well-known decision in Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978), where the Court rejected a TVA argument that
the Tellico Dam was not subject to the requirements of the ESA because of statements in
committee reports on appropriation bills.
80 NEDC, 477 F.3d at 684. “[A]n executive branch agency which views itself as subservient
to a sentence in a legislative report undermines the distribution of authority in our federal
government in which every exercise of political power is checked and balanced.” See id. at 685.
[L]egislative materials like committee reports, which are not themselves subject to the
requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee members – or, worse yet,
unelected staffers and lobbyists – both the power and the incentive to attempt strategic
manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to achieve
through the statutory text.

Id. at 684 n.13 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005));
see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring both the House of Representatives and the Senate
to pass a bill and the President to sign it, or, if the President returns the bill to the House in
which the bill originated, Congress may pass the bill into law if a two-thirds majority approves
it).
81 The statute never mentioned the FPC. Its only reference to BPA stated that
“[e]xpenditures from the Bonneville Power Administration Fund, established pursuant to Public
Law 93-454, are approved for official reception and representation expenses in an amount not to
exceed $1500. During fiscal year 2006, no new direct loan obligations may be made.” Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-103, 119 Stat. 2245, 2276 (2005).
82 NEDC, 477 F.3d at 682.
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Act,” which established a broad participatory process involving diverse
interest groups and the public to advise BPA.83 That statute requires BPA to
exercise its authority in a manner consistent with the Council’s Fish and
Wildlife Program.84 The most recent version of the Council’s Fish and
Wildlife Program calls for “the continued operation of the [FPC].”85 The
court suggested that BPA might depart from the Fish and Wildlife Program’s
directives “if such a departure was necessary for BPA to comply with its
statutory obligation to use its authority in a manner consistent with the
Council’s Power Plan or purposes of the [Northwest Power Act].”86
However, because BPA adopted a “slavish adherence to a sentence in a
committee report,” the court determined that “no nice question of balancing
potentially conflicting obligations [was] presented.”87 Since BPA made no
attempt to explain how terminating the FPC was consistent with the
Council’s program, the court concluded that the termination was arbitrary
and capricious.88

2. Unreasonably Departing from Past Practices
BPA unsuccessfully attempted to convince the court that its decision
to defund the FPC was based on factors independent of the language on
the congressional committee report. But in transferring the functions of
the FPC to two new entities, BPA departed from a two-decades-old
precedent.89 While an agency may change course if doing so is in the public
interest, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the agency “must supply a reasoned
analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliberately
changed, not casually ignored.”90 In deciding whether BPA supplied a
reasoned analysis, the court considered only the agency’s analysis in the
administrative record, refusing to accept “appellate counsel’s post hoc
83 Id. at 685. The Ninth Circuit noted that one purpose of the statute is “to allow the States,
local governments, and citizens of the Pacific Northwest . . . to participate in the development
of regional energy conservation plans, plans for renewable resources, and plans for
environmental protection and enhancement.” Id. at 685–86; see 16 U.S.C. § 839(3) (2000).
84 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(10)(A) (2000); see NEDC, 477 F.3d at 686.
85 Council’s 2003 Fish and Wildlife Program, supra note 57, at 27. See also id. at 28 (“The
[FPC] shall continue to provide an empirical database of fish passage information for use by the
region.”).
86 NEDC, 477 F.3d at 686.
87

Id.
Id. at 690. Although the Ninth Circuit concluded that BPA’s actions “frustrated the
statutory design of the Northwest Power Act,” id. at 685, the court did not directly rule on
88

NEDC’s claim that BPA’s decision to defund the FPC violated section 4(h)(10)(A) of the
Northwest Power Act (requiring BPA to use its funds in a manner consistent with the Council’s
Fish and Wildlife Program, the Council’s Power Plan, and the purposes of the Act); See Brief of
Petitioner at 29–31, NEDC, 477 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-70430) (dancing around the
issue with the quotation in the text accompanying note 86).
89 NEDC, 477 F.3d at 690. See also supra note 56 and accompanying text (on the origins of
the Fish Passage Center).
90 Id. at 687 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 57 (1983) (quoting Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(footnotes omitted))).
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rationalizations for agency action.”91 Nor would the court “supply a
reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has not
given.”92
According to the Ninth Circuit, BPA provided “scant evidence”93 of its
decision to defund the FPC. The agency argued that the court should
uphold its decision to transfer the functions of the FPC as a reasonable
application of the Northwest Power Act’s consistency requirement.94 But
the only evidence BPA could offer referencing the statute’s consistency
requirement were letters to the Yakama Tribe and to five members of the
Pacific Northwest’s congressional delegation, in which the agency simply
asserted, without any supporting documentation, that its Program
Solicitation complied with the agency’s statutory duty to act “in a manner
consistent with the Council’s Fish and Wildlife Program.”95 The Ninth
Circuit decided that this conclusive language in the letters neither
reflected a rational decision-making process,96 nor satisfactorily explained
BPA’s decision to transfer the functions of the FPC.97 Consequently, the
court held that the agency’s decision to transfer the functions of the FPC
was arbitrary.98

B. The Continued Existence of the Messenger
Although the Ninth Circuit enjoined BPA from defunding the FPC,99 the
decision hardly ensures the FPC’s continued existence. The relief the court
granted was limited to an order to continue funding the FPC under the terms
and conditions of the existing contract “unless and until” BPA can provide a

91
92

Id. at 688 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
Id. at 688 (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281,

285–86 (1974)).
93 Id. at 688 n.16.
94 Brief of Respondent at 25–32, NEDC, 477 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 006-70430).
95 NEDC, 477 F.3d at 689 (quoting the letters).
96 Id. The court also rejected BPA’s assertion that a PowerPoint slide, which assessed the
capabilities of potential replacements for the FPC, provided evidence of a rational decisionmaking process. Id. Not only did the PowerPoint slide fail to provide such evidence, it was not
clear whether BPA actually relied on the information presented in the slide because BPA
released the PowerPoint presentation on the same day the agency announced that it was
transferring the functions of the FPC to two entities. Id. at 688–89. Similarly, the court
considered a memorandum comparing the functions of the FPC with the combined proposed
functions of Battelle and Pacific States and determined that BPA could not have relied on that
memorandum in deciding to transfer the functions of the FPC, since it was drafted six weeks
after BPA awarded the contracts to Battelle and Pacific States. Id. at 689. The court concluded
that the memorandum was not evidence of a rational decision-making process. Id.
97 Id. at 690.
98 Id. BPA also argued that “its interpretation of the Northwest Power Act and its decision
to transfer the functions of the FPC [were] entitled to substantial deference.” Id. at 688 n.16;
Brief of Respondent at 30–32, NEDC, 477 F.3d 668 (9th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-70430), 2006 WL
2984628. The court suggested that BPA might be entitled to deference if it was interpreting the
Northwest Power Act but reiterated that “there is scant evidence in the record that BPA . . . was
interpreting any . . . provision of the Act.” NEDC, 477 F.3d at 688 n.16.
99 Id. at 691.
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legitimate “basis for displacing the FPC.”100 Thus, it appears that the relief
the court ordered could be interim.
The court suggested that BPA might be able to justify the dismantling of
the FPC by following the appropriate channels, noting that “on a proper
record with factual determinations and an adequate explanation of a rational
connection between facts determined and action taken,”101 BPA might be
able to show that a decision to “transfer the functions of the FPC [was]
consistent with the Council’s Fish and Wildlife Program” as well as “the
objectives of the Northwest Power Act.”102 But how BPA could provide such
a “proper record” is not at all clear, as defunding the FPC appears to be flatly
inconsistent with the Council’s Fish and Wildlife Program, which expressly
calls for the continued existence of the FPC.103 However, in late 2007 the
Council was in the process of amending the Fish and Wildlife Program104 and
could either call for the continuation of the FPC or its elimination.
The other means BPA and other opponents of the FPC might employ to
eliminate its existence is to change the law. But having declined to eliminate
the FPC in 2005, it does not seem likely that the current Congress will pass
legislation requiring the transfer of the FPC’s functions. As of this writing,
the FPC remains in operation, providing information on the state of salmon
migration. The controversy over this rather obscure entity stands as an
illustration of the importance of independent science in the contentious
Columbia Basin.105
IV. MAKING BPA FUND ALL FISH AND WILDLIFE RESTORATION COSTS
One of the primary purposes of the 1980 Northwest Power Act was to
elevate fish and wildlife protection and restoration to an “equal footing” with
hydropower generation in the operation of the Columbia Basin
100
101
102

Id.
Id. at 690 n.19.
Id. (“Because we hold that BPA’s decision to transfer the functions of the FPC was not

the output of a reasoned decision-making process . . . we need not determine whether, on a
proper record with factual determinations and an adequate explanation of a rational connection
between facts determined and action taken, a decision of BPA to transfer the functions of the
FPC is consistent with the Council’s Fish and Wildlife Program and with the [Power] Plan and
the objectives of the Northwest Power Act.”).
103 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
104 To amend the Council’s program, the Northwest Power Act requires the Council to solicit
recommendations from the region’s fish and wildlife agencies and appropriate Indian tribes for
measures for fish and wildlife affected by the hydropower operations in the Columbia River and
its tributaries. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(h)(2) (2000). The Council must make these recommendations
available for public comment, id. § 839b(h)(4)(B) (2000), and act on them within one year, id.
§ 839b(h)(9) (2000). The Council may reject a recommendation only for specified reasons. Id.
§ 839b(h)(7) (2000). See, e.g., Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. Nw. Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371,
1395 (9th Cir. 1994) (remanding to the Council for further reconsideration of a Fish and Wildlife
Program that “failed to explain a statutory basis for [the Council’s] rejection of
recommendations of fishery managers and . . . failed to evaluate proposed [Fish and Wildlife]
[P]rogram measures against sound biological objectives”).
105 See Rusch, supra note 60 (article explaining the genesis and some of the personalities
behind the NEDC s uit).
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hydrosystem.106 One means of doing so is to alter project operations to benefit
migrating salmon, as the BiOp litigation discussed in section I of this paper has
struggled, without much success, to accomplish. Another means is ensuring
that the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) raises sufficient revenues
through its rates to satisfy BPA’s fish and wildlife obligations. The Northwest
Power Act explicitly directs BPA to set its wholesale power rates sufficient to
cover all its costs, including fish and wildlife costs.107 But BPA has never been
enthusiastic about covering all fish and wildlife costs, as higher costs mean its
utility and industrial customers will pay higher rates and might even purchase
power elsewhere.
In order to pressure BPA to fulfill its statutory obligations toward fish
and wildlife, the Yakama and Umatilla tribes108 became active participants in
BPA’s administration proceeding setting wholesale power rates for the years
2002 to 2006. When BPA underestimated its fish and wildlife costs in that
proceeding, the tribes appealed to the Ninth Circuit,109 and on May 3, 2007 they
won a resounding victory.110
As a precursor to its 2002 to 2006 rate case, in 1998, BPA undertook a
public process of estimating its fish and wildlife costs, producing what it
called “Fish and Wildlife Funding Principles,” which laid out thirteen different
alternatives, each with its own cost, for satisfying BPA’s fish and wildlife
obligations.111 But because decisions on the means of fish and wildlife
recovery had not been made—and some were awaiting completion of the 2000
BiOp—BPA decided to treat all thirteen alternatives as if they had an equal

106 16 U.S.C. § 839(6) (2000) (setting forth that a purpose of the Act is “to protect, mitigate,
and enhance the fish and wildlife, including related spawning grounds and habitat, of the
Columbia River and its tributaries, particularly anadromous fish which are of significant
importance to the social and economic well-being of the Pacific Northwest and the Nation”);
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n,
746 F.2d 466, 473 (9th Cir. 1984) (“One purpose of the [Act] is to place fish and wildlife concerns
on an equal footing with power production.”).
107 16 U.S.C. § 839e(a), (g) (2000). Under a 1999 amendment, BPA’s rates for fish and wildlife
costs during 2002 to 2006 must “preserv[e BPA’s] ability to establish appropriate reserves and
maintain a high Treasury payment probability.” Id. § 839e(n) (2000). BPA is obligated to repay
“the Federal investment in the Federal Columbia River Power System.” Id. § 839e(a)(1)(2000);
see also id. § 839(4) (2000) (establishing that one purpose of the Act is to ensure that BPA
continues to “pay all costs necessary to produce, transmit, and conserve resources to meet the
region’s electric power requirements”).
108 Technically, the tribes are called the Yakama Nation and the Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation.
109 Appeals of BPA rate decisions must be filed in the Ninth Circuit. 16 U.S.C. § 839f(e)(5)
(2000).
110 Golden Nw. Aluminum, Inc. v. Bonneville Power Admin., No. 03-73426, 501 F.3d 1037,
1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding “that BPA’s fish and wildlife cost estimates and, by extension, the
rates based on those estimates, are not supported by substantial evidence”). BPA’s preference
customers (mostly public utilities) also appealed the BPA rate case decision, unsuccessfully
arguing that BPA impermissibly saddled them with the costs of supplying power to its industrial
customers. Id. at 1045–46. However, the preference customers succeeded in convincing the
court that BPA unlawfully charged them with the costs of a settlement reached with investorowned (private) utilities. Id. at 1046–48.
111 Id. at 1049.
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chance of occurring.112 Moreover, the agency refused to “revisit the policy
merits or wisdom” of this strategy during the rate case, or change its
assumption that annual fish and wildlife costs could range anywhere from
$438 to $721 million.113
The tribes objected to BPA’s giving equal weight to all thirteen
alternatives, maintaining that BPA should assume that the more expensive
alternatives were more likely to occur and arguing that the agency should
update the projected costs based on new information and a new risk analysis
provided by fish and wildlife agencies and tribes.114 The tribes considered
BPA’s reliance on outdated projections to be “arbitrary and unrealistic,”
amounting to “willful blindness.”115 Later, during a supplemental rate
proceeding undertaken due to problems caused by runaway electric prices,
BPA again refused to revise its projection, even though the tribes pointed to
new legal obligations under the Clean Water Act and the 2000 BiOp that
significantly raised the cost of habitat and hatchery restoration.116
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the tribes that BPA’s unwillingness to
recalculate its fish and wildlife costs was arbitrary, producing a rate
determination that was not supported by substantial evidence in the record.117
The court was influenced by BPA’s failure to adjust its 1998 estimates in
response to a 1999 interagency staff report by fishery managers, whose
analysis, the court noted, was entitled to “substantial weight” under the
Northwest Power Act.118 The staff report pointed out significant new
information on cost increases, and the tribes introduced undisputed testimony
that alternatives likely to satisfy ESA requirements would cause BPA’s
chances of repaying its Treasury obligations to fall well below the prescribed
minimum of eighty percent that BPA set in its rate case.119

112 2002 Notice of Proposed Wholesale Power Rate Adjustment, Public Hearing, and
Opportunities for Public Review and Comment, 64 Fed. Reg. 44,318, 44,321 (Aug. 13, 1999).
113 Id. at 44,322–23 (describing that the decision to consider all thirteen alternatives as
equally likely to occur are not at issue in the rate case); Golden Nw. Aluminum, 501 F.3d at 1049
(giving BPA’s range of estimated fish and wildlife costs). BPA did revise the cost estimates in
the “Fish and Wildlife Funding Principles” to $430 to $780 million, based on changes in the
market price for electricity, explaining that it was reasonable “‘to update one set of data, the
market prices, with the most recent data . . . and not update other data (on fish and wildlife
costs) where the source of that data is substantially less authoritative.’” Id.
114 Golden Nw. Aluminum, 501 F.3d at 1049.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 1052–53. The court rejected the tribes’ challenge to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission’s (FERC’s) confirmation of BPA’s rate determination, as the tribes filed a petition
for review of that decision one day past the sixty-day time period. Id. at 1050. Although parties
may challenge BPA rate decisions within ninety days of final agency action under the Northwest
Power Act, 16 U.S.C §§ 939f(e)(1)(G), 939f(e)(5) (2000), challenges to FERC decisions must be
filed within 60 days under the Federal Power Act. 16 U.S.C. § 825l(b) (2000). However, the court
considered its inability to review FERC’s action “of little practical consequence,” since the
focus of the judicial review provisions of the Northwest Power Act “is on BPA, not FERC.”
Golden Nw. Aluminum, 501 F.3d at 1050.
118 Golden Nw. Aluminum, 501 F.3d at 1051 (citing Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. Nw. Power Planning
Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1388 (9th Cir. 1994)).
119 Id. On BPA’s repayment obligations, see supra note 107 (explaining BPA must maintain a
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The court cited three developments that underscored the need for new
BPA cost projections when it undertook the supplemental rate proceeding in
late 2000 and early 2001: 1) the changed market conditions that caused BPA
to declare a financial emergency,120 2) increased costs associated with
implementing new Clean Water Act requirements imposed by an Oregon
District Court decision,121 and 3) increased costs from implementing the
requirements of the 2000 BiOp.122 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that BPA’s reliance on outdated cost estimates was not supported
by substantial evidence, and its exclusion of information on fish and wildlife
costs violated the Northwest Power Act’s commands that BPA recover all its
costs and operate “in accordance with sound business principles.”123
The result in this case did not receive the publicity that the Ninth
Circuit’s affirmation of Judge Redden in the 2004 BiOp case did, but the
ramifications are potentially quite far-reaching. The court was unwilling to
defer to BPA, even though BPA has a long record of success in defending
itself against utility and industrial challenges to its rates.124 Instead, it
reiterated that it was the fishery managers to whom the court should defer
under the terms of the Northwest Power Act.125 Perhaps the court sensed
that in the case of fish and wildlife restoration, BPA is not exactly a neutral
judge, as it has a long history of shortchanging Columbia Basin fish and
wildlife.126

high Treasury payment probability to support its obligation to repay federal investment).
120 Golden Nw. Aluminum, 501 F.3d at 1052. On the 2000 financial emergency experienced by
BPA, see Practicing Deception, supra note 2, at 807 (describing the 2000 to 2001 West Coast
electricity crisis and BPA’s role in it, including the agency’s invocation of waivers of salmon
protection authorized by the 2000 BiOp); Michael C. Blumm & Daniel J. Rohlf, The BPA PowerSalmon Crisis: A Way Out, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,726, 10,726–27 (2001).
121 Golden Nw. Aluminum, 501 F.3d at 1052 (citing Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 132 F. Supp. 2d 876 (D.Or. 2001)).
122 Id. The 2000 BiOp, of course, failed to survive judicial scrutiny because the “offsite
mitigation” on which it relied either was not scrutinized in ESA consultation or was not
reasonably certain to occur. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d
1196, 1213 (D.Or. 2003), discussed supra text accompanying note 12, and in Practicing
Deception, supra note 2, at 760–63.
123 Golden Nw. Aluminum, 501 F.3d at 1052–53 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 839e(a)(1) (2000)).
124 See, e.g., Cent. Lincoln Peoples’ Util. Dist. v. Johnson, 735 F.2d 1101, 1129 (9th Cir. 1984)
(upholding BPA’s 1981 rate determinations); Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Johnson, 754 F.2d 1475,
1482 (9th Cir. 1985) (upholding BPA’s decision to provide electricity to its direct service
industrial customers at reduced rates on the ground that unusual circumstances justified BPA in
acting without strict compliance with ratemaking procedures called for by the Northwest
Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 839e); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonneville Power Admin., 261
F.3d 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding BPA’s determination that aluminum smelters
purchasing power directly from BPA could purchase surplus firm power only under a fixed rate,
rather than under a more flexible rate).
125 Golden Nw. Aluminum, 501 F.3d at 1051.
126 See, e.g., SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 10, at 18 (maintaining that the Northwest
Power Act was only advisory); id. at 25 (encouraging a congressional “cost cap” on salmon
recovery costs); id. at 140 (failing to supervise a study to establish restoration goals for
Columbia Basin fish and wildlife); id. at 155–56 (resisting the Northwest Power Act’s equitable
treatment directive); id. at 159 (declaring a power emergency in 2001 that allowed invocation of
an administratively created ESA exemption); id. at 188–89 (opposing breaching of the Lower

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1023489
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1023489

GAL.BLUMM.DOC

2008]

2/1/2008 4:26:48 PM

IMPOSING JUDICIAL RESTRAINTS

69

But maybe the most significant development in the case was the
participation of the tribes in the rate case itself. If BPA rate proceedings—
which are long, complex, technical affairs—are no longer limited to utility
and industrial customers whose interests are largely limited to keeping BPA
rates low, but also includes tribal governments whose primary interest is
fish and wildlife restoration, the dynamics of these proceedings will surely
change. And if the tribes know they can call upon the Ninth Circuit for
careful review, the incentives to participate will be high. The result could be,
at long last, sufficient funding for Columbia Basin fish and wildlife
restoration.
V. REQUIRING NOAA TO IMPLEMENT THE ESA’S PREFERENCE FOR WILD SALMON
The preponderance of hatchery salmon in the Pacific Northwest has
created confusion and controversy in ESA implementation.127 Since some
salmon runs, particularly those in the Columbia Basin, consist of upwards of
eighty percent hatchery fish,128 and since scientists now widely recognize
that hatchery salmon pose threats to salmon spawning in the wild,129 some

Snake Dams); id. at 254 (damaging salmon migration with peak power operations).
127 See Endangered and Threatened Species: Final Listing Determinations for 10 Distinct
Population Segments of West Coast Steelhead, 71 Fed. Reg. 834, 854 (Jan. 5, 2006) (to be
codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 223–24) [hereinafter Final Listing Determinations] (“The predominance
of hatchery-origin natural spawners . . . generates uncertainty in evaluating trends in natural
abundance and productivity.”); Joseph A. Brown, Commercially Harvesting Endangered

Salmon? Rethinking the Interaction of Salmon Hatcheries and the Endangered Species Act After
Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 40 GA. L. REV. 253, 261 (2005) (suggesting that “the sheer
magnitude and historical entrenchment of hatchery use will ensure that hatcheries affect the
future of salmon as a federally protected species and natural resource”). See also SACRIFICING
THE SALMON, supra note 10, at 109–28 (discussing the failed attempts to use salmon hatcheries
to artificially enhance Columbia Basin salmon runs); JIM LICHATOWICH, SALMON WITHOUT RIVERS:
A HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC SALMON CRISIS 123–50, 207–21 (1999) (providing an historical overview
of the Pacific Northwest’s reliance on hatcheries).
128 See, e.g., Final Listing Determinations, supra note 127, at 854 (noting that hatchery-origin
natural spawned salmon can account for approximately seventy to ninety percent of adult
returns in some areas).
129 NOAA Fisheries, Northwest Fisheries Science Center, Risks to Wild Populations From
Hatchery Fish, http://www.nwfsc.noaa.gov/resources/salmonhatchery/risks.cfm (last visited
Jan. 27, 2008) (discussing genetic, ecological, and behavioral risks; risks from overharvesting
mixed-stock fisheries; and risks from disease). Judge Coughenour, in Trout Unlimited v. Lohn,
No. CV06-0483-JCC, 2007 WL 1795036, at *3 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2007) (citations omitted)
[hereinafter Trout Unlimited I ] , citing liberally from the administrative record developed in that
case, recognized these risks:
[T]he presence of hatchery salmon in an ecosystem can negatively impact the viability of
the wild populations in a variety of ways. Hatcheries are capable of releasing far more
fish fry than result from natural spawning. These floods of hatchery fish can result in the
appearance of a well-stocked fishery, though in actuality it would not be so without
human interference. This, in turn, can lead to overfishing and increased pressures on
wild stocks. Hatchery and wild salmon also have ecological interactions that are
detrimental to the wild population—hatchery fish, which tend to be larger than wild fish,
compete for habitat and food and prey upon smaller wild fish. Interbreeding between
hatchery and wild stocks poses genetic risks to wild populations as well, due to the ways
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salmon advocates see continued reliance on hatchery fish to sustain salmon
harvests as a Faustian bargain.130 But those who chafe at the development
restrictions imposed by the ESA see hatchery fish as a vehicle to terminate
ESA listings: if hatchery fish are part of the same salmon “species,” this
thinking goes, there is no shortage of salmon and no reason for ESA listings.
The federal agency in charge of salmon listings, NOAA, has taken a middle
ground, adopting neither of these opposing perspectives. NOAA believes
that, under certain circumstances, hatchery salmon can help in conservation
and in recovery of salmon that spawn in the wild.131
Disagreements over the role of hatchery salmon in ESA listings and
implementation have generated numerous lawsuits over issues such as
whether to assess the effects of hatchery fish on wild fish in making listing
determinations,132 whether NOAA may choose not to list hatchery salmon
under the ESA if they interbreed with wild salmon,133 and whether hatchery
fish should, or must, receive the same protections that wild fish receive after
listing.134
This section briefly summarizes the events leading to recent challenges
to NOAA’s hatchery salmon policies and related ESA salmon listing
decisions. It then examines two recent district court decisions concerning
the role of hatchery fish in the ESA. The Western District of Washington
ruled that because the ESA’s primary purpose is to protect wild fish, NOAA’s
hatchery fish policy violated the ESA by allowing listing decisions to be

in which the environmental pressures of the hatchery differ from those in the wild, thus
leading to the selection of different traits.
130 To characterize a bargain as “Faustian” is to attribute it with “sacrificing spiritual values
for material gain” or “insatiably striving for knowledge and mastery.” WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INT’L DICTIONARY 829 (Philip Babcock Gove ed. 1971).
131 Policy on the Consideration of Hatchery-Origin Fish in Endangered Species Act Listing
Determinations for Pacific Salmon and Steelhead, 70 Fed. Reg. 37,204, 37,213 (June 28, 2005) (to
be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 223–24) [hereinafter Hatchery Listing Policy] (noting that hatchery
fish can positively affect a salmon ESU by increasing abundance and productivity, improving
spatial distribution, and serving as a means to repopulation of unoccupied habitat). NOAA uses
the term “natural populations” to refer to salmon that spawn in the wild, “recognizing that these
fish may be the progeny of naturally-spawned and hatchery-origin fish in varying proportions.”
Id. at 37,214. NOAA considers hatchery fish to be a “genetic lineage of hatchery fish propagated
at one or more hatchery facilities, recognizing that a hatchery stock can have a wide range of
gene flow with populations of natural-origin fish.” Id. For simplicity purposes, this article refers
to NOAA’s “natural populations” as wild fish.
132 See, e.g., Trout Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036, discussed infra Parts V.B, D (considering
whether NOAA’s decision to assess collectively the threat of endangerment of populations of
wild salmon and hatchery salmon violated the purpose of the ESA).
133 See, e.g., Alsea Valley Alliance v. Evans, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1162 (D.Or. 2001)
[hereinafter Alsea I ] , discussed infra Parts IV.A, D (considering whether NOAA’s decision to list
only wild populations of coho salmon, and not hatchery populations, as “threatened” was
arbitrary and capricious).
134 See, e.g., Alsea Valley Alliance v. Lautenbacher, No. 06-6093-HO, 2007 WL 2344927 (D.Or.
Aug. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Alsea II ] , discussed infra Parts IV.C–D (discussing NOAA’s decision
to promulgate protective regulations for wild salmon listed as threatened, but not for some
hatchery populations).
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affected by hatchery fish.135 On the other hand, the District Court of Oregon
upheld NOAA’s hatchery policy, which itself was a response to an earlier
decision from the same court,136 deferring to the agency’s determination that
because hatchery fish may provide important benefits to wild fish, hatchery
fish may influence the listing of wild fish.137 The ramifications of these
decisions on the future of ESA protection for wild salmon are potentially farreaching.

A. Challenging NOAA’s Hatchery Policies
The ESA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of
Commerce to decide whether to list a species as endangered or
threatened.138 The statute defines a “species” to include “any subspecies . . .
and any distinct population segment of any species . . . which interbreeds
when mature.”139 The ESA does not, however, define “distinct population
segment (DPS),”140 nor does that term have an accepted scientific meaning.
In 1991, NOAA concluded that “a major motivating factor behind the ESA
was the desire to preserve genetic variability, both between and within
species.”141 Consequently, the agency interpreted a salmon DPS to be an
“evolutionarily significant unit (ESU) of a biological species.”142 Under this
policy, a salmon stock would qualify as an ESU if it were: 1) “substantially
reproductively isolated” from other population units, and 2) represented an
“important component in the evolutionary legacy of the species.”143
135 Trout Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036, at *20. NOAA uses the term “natural populations” to
refer to salmon spawning in the wild. See supra note 131. We prefer to use the latter term.
136 Alsea I, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1163–64.
137 Alsea II, 2007 WL 2344927, at *5.
138 ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1) (2000). Under the ESA, the Secretary of the Interior makes
listing determinations for terrestrial and freshwater species, while the Secretary of Commerce
makes listing determinations as to marine and anadromous species. Id. § 1532(15) (2000).
Because salmon are anadromous, the agency in charge of listing determinations for salmon
species is NOAA, formerly NMFS, see supra note 11. ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (2000). After
conducting a status review of a species, the Secretary is to make a determination “solely on the
basis of the best scientific and commercial data available,” id. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000)), as to
whether a species is threatened or endangered due to any of five factors, id. §1533(a)(1) (2000).
The relevant factors are: 1) the deterioration of the species’ habitat or range, 2) overuse due to
“commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational activities,” 3) disease and predation, 4)
existing regulatory schemes, and 5) “other natural or manmade factors affecting [the species’]
continued existence.” Id. § 1533(a)(1)(A)–(E) (2000).
139 Id. § 1532(16) (2000).
140 See, e.g., Trout Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036, at *4 (stating “[t]he term ‘distinct
population segment’ . . . is not further defined in the statute, nor does it have an understood
meaning in scientific circles”).
141 Policy on Applying the Definition of Species Under the Endangered Species Act to Pacific
Salmon, 56 Fed. Reg. 58,612, 58,612 (Nov. 20, 1991) [hereinafter ESU Policy].
142 Id. at 58,618.
143 Id. As to the first criterion: the isolation “does not have to be absolute, but it must be
strong enough to permit evolutionarily important differences to accrue in different population
units.” Id. As to the second criterion: a population represents an important component of the
species’ evolutionary legacy if extinction of the population would “represent a significant loss to
the ecological/genetic diversity of the species.” Id. In making this determination, NOAA would
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Two years after adopting the ESU policy, in 1993, NOAA issued a policy
explaining how the agency would consider hatchery populations when
making salmon listing decisions under the ESA.144 This interim hatchery
policy interpreted the ESA to require NOAA to focus recovery efforts on
“natural populations.”145 Despite acknowledging the substantial risks that
hatchery fish pose to wild salmon populations and their habitats,146 the
interim policy maintained that artificial propagation “may represent a
potential method to conserve listed salmon species when the artificially
propagated fish are . . . similar to the listed natural population in genetic,
phenotypic, and life-history traits, and in habitat use characteristics.”147
Nonetheless, the interim hatchery policy “was clear that artificial
propagation was to be used only to the extent that it could further the ESA’s
central purpose of preserving and promoting self-sustaining natural
populations.”148 The interim hatchery listing policy did not, however,
establish standards governing how NOAA would conduct a status review of
a salmon ESU that included both wild and hatchery fish.149
This interim hatchery policy did establish parameters for listing
hatchery fish as threatened or endangered.150 The policy provided that even
if hatchery fish were included in an ESU in danger of extinction, NOAA
would not include hatchery fish as part of the listed species unless the
hatchery fish were “essential for the recovery of the species.”151 Since NOAA
consider whether the population: 1) is “genetically distinct from other conspecific populations;”
2) “occup[ies] unusual or distinctive habitat;” and 3) “show[s] evidence of unusual or distinctive
adaptation to its environment.” Id.
144 Interim Policy on Artificial Propagation of Pacific Salmon Under the Endangered Species
Act, 58 Fed. Reg. 17,573, 17,573 (Apr. 5, 1993) [hereinafter Interim Hatchery Policy].
145 Id. (stating that the ESA “mandates the restoration of threatened and endangered species
in their natural habitats to a level at which they can sustain themselves without further legal
protection. For Pacific salmon . . . the ESA’s focus is, therefore, on natural populations—the
progeny of naturally spawning fish—and the ecosystems upon which they depend.”).
146 Id. at 17,574 (discussing the potentially harmful genetic and ecological risks that hatchery
fish may pose to natural salmon populations).
147

Id.
Trout Unlimited I, No. CV06-0483-JCC, slip op. at 9; 2007 WL 1795036, at *6 (W.D. Wash.
filed June 13, 2007), discussed infra Part IV.B.
149 See id.; see generally Interim Hatchery Policy, supra note 144 (discussing policies and
148

guidelines for listing hatchery fish, but conveying no information on status review).
150 Interim Hatchery Policy, supra note 144, at 17,574–75.
151 Id. at 17,575. Under the Interim Hatchery Policy, hatchery fish would not be considered
part of the biological ESU if:
(1) the hatchery population in question is of a different genetic lineage than the listed
natural populations,
(2) artificial propagation has produced appreciable changes in the hatchery population in
characteristics that are believed to have a genetic basis, or
(3) there is substantial uncertainty about the relationship between existing hatchery fish
and the natural population.

Id. Situations that could warrant listing of the hatchery fish portions of an ESU could arise “if
the natural population faces a high, short-term risk of extinction, or if the hatchery population is
believed to contain a substantial proportion of the genetic diversity remaining in the species.”
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determined that hatchery salmon populations could pose risks to wild
salmon populations, the agency elected not to apply ESA protections to all
hatchery fish.152
In 1998, NOAA employed both the 1991 ESU policy and the 1993 interim
hatchery policy in listing Oregon Coast coho as threatened.153 The agency
defined the coho ESU as consisting of both wild populations and several
Oregon hatchery populations.154 But NOAA did not include the hatchery
populations in the listing because it did not consider the hatchery
populations to be “essential to recovery.”155
In 2001, after a widely circulated video showed surplus coho hatchery
salmon being clubbed to death by fishery managers, a coalition of
agricultural, forestry, and development interests, led by Alsea Valley Alliance
(Alsea), challenged application of the interim hatchery policy in the context
of NOAA’s listing of Oregon Coast coho.156 Alsea argued that NOAA had no
authority to decide not to protect hatchery fish the agency had included in
the Oregon Coast ESU, while protecting the wild fish in that ESU. Doing so,
Alsea maintained, was arbitrary, and therefore unlawful under the
Administrative Procedure Act.157
Judge Michael Hogan of the District of Oregon largely agreed, ruling
that NOAA lacked the statutory authority to make listing distinctions below
that of subspecies or a DPS of a species under the ESA.158 More specifically,
he said “[t]he central problem with the . . . listing decision . . . is that it makes
improper distinctions, below that of an [ESU], by excluding hatchery coho
populations from listing protection even though they are determined to be
part of the same [ESU] as natural coho populations.”159 Thus, according to
Judge Hogan, once NOAA determined that both hatchery populations and
wild populations were present within the same ESU, it could not choose to
protect only the wild fish.160 Hogan was unmoved by environmentalist claims
Id.
152

Id.

153

Threatened Status for the Oregon Coast Evolutionarily Significant Unit of Coho Salmon,
63 Fed. Reg. 42,587, 42,587, 42,589 (Aug. 10, 1998) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 227) (generally
utilizing the 1991 ESU policy and explicitly referencing the 1993 interim hatchery policy).
154 Id. at 42,589.
155 Id.
156 Alsea I, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1154–55 (D.Or. 2001). Alsea was represented by the Pacific
Legal Foundation, a national property-rights organization that proclaims that it acts as “a potent
representative in the courts for Americans who have grown weary of overregulation by big
government, overindulgence by the courts, and excessive interference in the American way of
life.” Pacific Legal Foundation, About Us, http://www.pacificlegal.org/?mvcTask=about (last
visited Jan. 27, 2008).
157 Alsea I, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
158 Id. at 1163.
159 Id. at 1162 (emphasis added).
160 Id. (“NMFS may consider listing only an entire species, subspecies or [DPS] of any
species.”) (citing ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2007)). According to Judge Hogan, “[o]nce NMFS
determined that hatchery spawned coho and naturally spawned coho were part of the same
DPS/ESU, the listing decision should have been made without further distinctions between
members of the same DPS/ESU.” Id. See also Hatchery Listing Policy, supra note 131, at 37,212
(interpreting Judge Hogan’s decision to mean that if NOAA determines “that a DPS warrants
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that affording ESA protection to hatchery fish would undermine the ESA’s
principal goal of protecting wild fish and their habitat.161
Ignoring scientific evidence suggesting that there are important
differences between wild and hatchery fish populations,162 Judge Hogan
proclaimed that wild and natural coho were “genetically identical.”163 He
also disregarded NOAA’s contention that a central goal of the ESA is to
conserve wild salmon populations.164 Consequently, Judge Hogan invalidated
NOAA’s 1998 listing decision as arbitrary and remanded the issue to the
agency for further consideration.165

B. Revising NOAA’s Hatchery Policies
The federal government chose not to appeal Judge Hogan’s 2001
decision,166 but instead opted to redraft the 1993 interim hatchery policy, and
then re-evaluate the status of twenty-seven listed West Coast salmon
stocks.167 The new policy announced that “[s]tatus determinations for Pacific
salmon . . . ESUs will be based on the status of the entire ESU.”168 NOAA
maintained that it would “apply this policy in support of the conservation of
naturally-spawning salmon and the ecosystems upon which they depend,

listing, all members of the defined species must be included in the listing. The court did not rule
on how the agency should determine whether the species is in danger of extinction or likely to
become so in the foreseeable future.”).
161 See Alsea I, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 1160 n.3 (discussing Oregon Trout’s amicus curiae brief).
162 See, e.g., Interim Hatchery Policy, supra note 144, at 17,574:
Because there is, at present, considerable uncertainty about artificial propagation as a
means to increase natural salmon populations, and because artificial propagation may
have profound consequences for the viability of natural salmon populations,
consideration of its use should be based on an objective assessment of genetic and
ecological risks, balancing the potential for deleterious effects against risk to the
population of irreversible harm or extinction if artificial propagation is not implemented.
163
164

Alsea I, 1161 F. Supp. 2d at 1163.
See id. (“Although I agree with the general concept that ‘genetic diversity’ is one factor in

the long term success of a threatened species, and thus is one of many underlying goals of the
ESA, genetics cannot, by itself, justify a listing distinction that runs contrary to the definition of
a DPS.”).
165 Id. at 1163.
166 The Western District of Washington later noted that NMFS declined to appeal the Alsea I
decision “for reasons that strike the Court as rather transparent.” Trout Unlimited I, No. CV060483-JCC, slip op. at 13; 2007 WL 1795036, at *7 (W.D. Wash. filed June 13, 2007). Although the
federal government did not appeal, environmentalists attempted to challenge the Hogan
decision, but the Ninth Circuit did not reach the merits of their appeal due to lack of
jurisdiction. Because the environmentalists were not party to the original Alsea I case, and their
appeal was interlocutory in nature, the court determined that Judge Hogan’s order was not a
final decision, and therefore was not appealable by the environmentalists. Alsea Valley Alliance
v. Dep’t of Commerce, 358 F.3d 1181, 1181 (9th Cir. 2004).
167 Hatchery Listing Policy, supra note 131. Endangered and Threatened Species: Proposed
Listing Determinations for 27 ESUs of West Coast Salmonids, 69 Fed. Reg. 33,102 (proposed
June 14, 2004) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 223–24).
168 NOAA’s 2003 revised hatchery listing policy continued to employ the 1991 ESU policy to
determine the makeup of an ESU. Hatchery Listing Policy, supra note 131, at 37,215.
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consistent with section 2(b) of the ESA.”169 And, consistent with Judge
Hogan’s decision, the 2005 hatchery listing policy required NOAA to list both
wild and hatchery fish as if both were part of an endangered or threatened
salmon ESU.170
Along with the new hatchery listing policy, NOAA made revised listing
determinations for sixteen ESUs of West Coast salmon and promulgated
amended protective regulations under section 4(d) of the Act for salmon
listed as threatened.171 In conducting the status reviews that produced these
listing determinations,172 NOAA employed a two-step process.173 First, the
Pacific Salmonid Biological Review Team (BRT) assessed the viability of
wild populations within each ESU.174 Second, NOAA evaluated the effects of
hatchery stocks on the extinction risk of the entire ESU.175 These status
reviews resulted in the removal of Oregon Coast coho from the ESA list and
the downlisting of Upper Columbia River steelhead from endangered to
threatened status.176 Then, declaring that “[n]ot all hatchery stocks

169

Id. Section 2(b) of the ESA states that the purposes of the ESA

are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and
threatened species depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation
of such endangered species and threatened species, and to take such steps as may be
appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth in
subsection (a) of this section.
ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000).
170 Hatchery Listing Policy, supra note 131, at 37,215.
171 Endangered and Threatened Species: Final Listing Determinations for 16 ESUs of West
Coast Salmon and Final 4(d) Protective Regulations for Threatened Salmonid ESUs, 70 Fed.
Reg. 37,160 (June 28, 2005) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pts. 223–24) [hereinafter 2005 Listing
Determinations]. Under section 4(d) of the ESA, NOAA may issue conservation regulations
authorizing the regulated taking of threatened (but not endangered) species. ESA, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1533(d) (2000).
172 The ESA calls for secretarial determinations concerning the status of a species in section
4(a), 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2000) (determinations made on the basis of habitat loss, overuse,
disease or predation, inadequate regulatory alternatives, and other natural or manmade
factors). These determinations must be made on the basis of best available science. Id.
§ 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000).
173 2005 Listing Determinations, supra note 171, at 37,162.
174 Endangered and Threatened Species: Proposed Listing Determinations for 27 ESUs of
West Coast Salmonids, supra note 167, at 33,110. The Biological Review Team was comprised of
an expert panel of scientists from several federal agencies including NOAA, the Fish and
Wildlife Service, and the U.S. Geological Survey. Id.
175 Id. at 33,111. NOAA considered the findings of an Artificial Propagation Evaluation
Workshop (APEW) which analyzed the BRT and SHIEER findings and assessed the overall
extinction risk of the entire ESU. Id. The APEW group consisted of federal scientists with
expertise in artificial propagation. Id.
176 On the downlisting of Upper Columbia River steelhead, see Final Listing Determinations,
supra note 127, at 854–55 (noting that “assessment of the effects of artificial propagation on the
DPS’s extinction risk concluded that hatchery programs collectively mitigate the immediacy of
extinction risk for the Upper Columbia River steelhead DPS in the short term, but that the
contribution of these programs in the foreseeable future is uncertain”). Much to the
disappointment of the Alsea I plaintiffs, who hoped their victory in Judge Hogan’s court would
lead to large-scale ESA deregulation, NOAA reaffirmed the status of all the other salmon ESUs
it reviewed. See id. at 834; 2005 Listing Determinations, supra note 171, at 37,193. On the

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1023489
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1023489

GAL.BLUMM.DOC

76

2/1/2008 4:26:48 PM

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 38:47

considered to be part of listed ESUs are of equal value for use in
conservation and recovery,”177 NOAA promulgated section 4(d) regulations
for salmon listed as threatened that extended protection only to wild fish
and select hatchery fish.178

C. Trout Unlimited I: Recognizing the ESA’s Goal of Protecting Wild Salmon
By allowing hatchery fish to affect the listing status of wild fish, the
new hatchery policy drew the opposition of environmentalists, who
claimed that it was both inconsistent with the ESA’s central purpose of
protecting self-sustaining populations in their natural habitats and failed to
comply with the statutory directive of using the best available science.179
Environmentalists also challenged NOAA’s downlisting of the Upper
Columbia River steelhead ESU.180 Groups championing water rights, land
development, and agricultural interests also argued against NOAA’s
decisions, but on the ground that NOAA had no statutory authority to make
distinctions between hatchery and wild salmon once they were in the same
ESU.181
In Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, Judge John Coughenour of the Western
District of Washington announced that “[t]hough it scarcely seems open to
debate . . . in evaluating any policy or listing determination under the ESA,
its polestar must be the viability of naturally self-sustaining populations in
their naturally-occurring habitat.”182 He noted that NOAA previously
interpreted the ESA to focus on the protection and promotion of selfsustaining wild populations “on numerous previous occasions,”183

delisting of Oregon Coast coho, see infra note 229.
177 2005 Listing Determinations, supra note 171, at 37,195.
178 Id. Regulations protect threatened salmon with intact adipose fins, but authorize the
taking of hatchery salmon with clipped adipose fins. Id. NMFS can use its section 4(d) authority
to allow the harvest of listed hatchery fish that are surplus to the conservation and recovery
needs of the ESU, consistent with approved harvest plans. Id. at 37,194.
179 See, e.g., Trout Unlimited I, No. CV-06-0483-JCC, 2007 WL 1795036 (W.D. Wash. June 13,
2007). The plaintiffs were Trout Unlimited, American Rivers, Pacific Rivers Council, Wild
Steelhead Coalition, Native Fish Society, Sierra Club, and the Federation of Fly Fishers. The
Building Industry of Washington, the Coalition for Idaho Water, the Idaho Water Users
Association, and the Washington State Farm Bureau intervened on the side of NOAA.
180 Id. at *12. The delisting of Oregon Coast coho was the subject of another suit in the
Oregon District Court. See infra note 229.
181 Trout Unlimited I, at *16 n.12. Citing Alsea I, the deregulatory groups argued that the ESA
requires NOAA to treat both hatchery and naturally spawned fish the same at every stage of the
ESA listing process. Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 15, Trout
Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036. Judge Coughenour disagreed. He stated that “it is not only
permissible for [NOAA] to treat hatchery and naturally-spawning salmon differently in assessing
the risk of extinction faced by an ESU, it will sometimes be required in order to adhere to the
central purpose of the ESA.” Trout Unlimited I, at *16 n.12.
182 Id. at *15 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531(b) (2000) (ecosystem purpose of the ESA),
1533(a)(3)(A)(i) (authority to designate critical habitat), 1532(5)(A) (2000) (definition of critical
habitat) H.R. REP. No. 95-1625, at 5 (1978) (providing the requirement to return species to
naturally self-sustaining condition)).
183 Id. at *16. The court also pointed to legislative history emphasizing the relationship
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including the interim hatchery policy184 and the ensuing hatchery listing
policy.185
Judge Coughenour observed that the revised hatchery listing policy
required status determinations to be based on the entire ESU, including
both hatchery and natural components, instead of using only wild
populations as the benchmark.186 He noted that if NOAA had made the
status determinations based only on the viability of the wild salmon, the
status review would have ended with the BRT’s assessment of the viability
of naturally spawning populations in each ESU, instead of following the
BRT assessment with NOAA’s evaluation of the effects of hatchery salmon
on the entire ESU.187 The upshot in the case of the Upper Columbia
steelhead ESU was that the BRT’s recommended endangered status, based
on wild populations that were “only a fraction of interim recovery targets”
and that showed no improvement in an “extremely low replacement rate,”
became only a partial assessment.188 NOAA’s final assessment, which
considered the effects of six hatchery programs on the ESU, thought it
“reasonable” to conclude that “the benefits provided by the artificial
propagation programs to the ESU’s abundance and spatial structure could
mitigate the immediacy of the ESU’s extinction risks.”189 This possible
mitigation produced the downlisting of Upper Columbia steelhead from
endangered to threatened status.190

between viable species and their ecosystems. Id. at *15.
184 Interim Hatchery Policy, supra note 144, at 17,573 (“The ESA . . . mandates the restoration
of threatened and endangered species in their natural habitats to a level at which they can
sustain themselves without further legal protection. For Pacific salmon . . . the ESA’s focus is,
therefore, on natural populations . . . .”).
185 Hatchery Listing Policy, supra note 131, at 37,207–08 (“We agree that the intent of the
ESA is to conserve natural self-sustaining populations and functioning ecosystems.”). This
perceived change in policy may have influenced Judge Coughenour’s decision not to give
Chevron deference to NOAA’s hatchery listing policy. See Trout Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036
at, *13 (reviewing the validity of the hatchery policy under the arbitrary and capricious standard
of the Administrative Procedure Act).
186 Trout Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036 at, *17.
187 Id. at *18. On the BRT, see supra note 174 and accompanying text. The BRT did not
ignore the effects of hatchery fish, but limited its consideration to the effects of hatchery fish on
viability of wild populations, warning that “[h]atchery production may mask declines in natural
populations that will be missed if only raw population abundance data are considered.
Therefore a true assessment of the viability of natural populations cannot be attained with
information about the genetic and demographic contribution of naturally spawning hatchery
fish.” Id. at *18 (quoting the BRT report). Judge Coughenour specifically approved the BRT
focus on sustainability of wild populations as consistent with the ESA’s “central purpose.” Id. at
*19.
188 Id. at *19. There was some dissent among BRT members concerning the endangered
status of the Upper Columbia steelhead because of resident steelhead existing alongside
anadromous steelhead with no obvious barriers to interbreeding. Id. at *18 (discussing the BRT
report).
189 Id. at *20 (quoting from a NOAA Artificial Propagation Evaluation Workshop).
190 Id. (“Then, in a separate evaluation, [the Artificial Propagation Evaluation Workshop]
considered the effects of artificial propagation on the entire ESU, found that hatcheries
provided increases in total abundance and spatial structure and recommended that the ESU be
listed as threatened.”).
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This result, Judge Coughenour concluded, was inconsistent with the
ESA’s central purpose of conserving naturally self-sustaining populations.191
He reasoned that there was nothing in the agency’s administrative record
providing scientific justification for basing status determinations on the
entire ESU, and that doing so was contrary to the best available scientific
evidence because “a healthy hatchery population is not necessarily an
indication of a healthy natural population, and that in actuality, a healthy
population can negatively affect the viability of a natural population.”192 He
therefore set aside both the hatchery listing policy and the downlisting of the
Upper Columbia River steelhead ESU.193 Both the reasoning and the result

191 Id. at *16 (“The Court concludes that the central purpose of the ESA, and the organizing
principle upon which ESA listings must be made, is the protection and promotion of
endangered and threatened species to the point of being naturally self-sustaining.”). See also id.
at *20 (repeating that the ESA’s “central purpose” is “to promote and conserve naturally selfsustaining populations”).
192 Id. at *21. See id. at *20 (“The scientific evidence in the record does not support a
conclusion that an assessment of the status of an entire ESU is an appropriate proxy for
assessing the status of natural populations.”); id. at *21 (“[M]easuring the health of a salmon
population by reference to the combined hatchery and natural populations does not necessarily
provide an appropriate assessment of whether the natural population is on its way to becoming
self-sustaining without human interference, and indeed, a healthy hatchery population may
mask or obscure the decline of a natural population.”). While Judge Coughenour endorsed the
preservation of wild salmon populations, he was unwilling to hold that hatchery and wild fish
could never be included in the same ESU. Id. at *22. He thought it enough to conclude “that
status determinations must be made with the health and viability of natural populations as the
benchmark.” Id.
193 Id. at *23. However, Judge Coughenour did refuse to overrule NOAA’s denial of petitions
requesting the agency to place wild and hatchery fish in separate ESUs. Id. Although he
concluded that “[i]t is clear that hatchery fish have important differences from wild fish,” he
refused to rule that that NOAA’s denials were arbitrary and capricious. Id. at *22. On the same
day Judge Coughenour ruled on Trout Unlimited, he ruled on a parallel case involving nearly all
of the same parties and having the same caption. Trout Unlimited v. Lohn, No. CV05-1128-JCC,
2007 WL 1730090 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2007) [hereinafter Trout Unlimited II ] . In this case, the
environmentalists claimed that NOAA violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
by failing to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) or an Environmental
Assessment before adopting the hatchery listing policy. Id. at *9; see also National
Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2000) (requiring that “to the fullest extent
possible,” agencies prepare an EIS for any major federal action significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment). Judge Coughenour noted that exemptions from the procedural
requirements of NEPA apply if there is either a direct conflict between NEPA and other
statutes, or if the NEPA procedures would be “redundant with those provided for under the
statute seeking exemption.” Trout Unlimited II, 2007 WL 1730090 at, *12. He held that both
exemptions applied to NOAA’s hatchery listing policy. Id. at *17. As to the first exemption, he
observed that the purposes of NEPA and the ESA “will often be in harmony, but to the extent
that they are not, the considerations set out in the ESA control, and cabin the Secretary’s
discretion in drafting guidance documents as well as making listing determinations.” Id. at *13.
As to the second exemption, “[T]he purposes of NEPA have been served in the present case”
because “the public had notice and opportunity to comment on the [hatchery listing policy], and
[NOAA] considered alternatives proposed in these comments, and because the ESA procedures
that displaced those of NEPA as to listing designations will apply to any action taken pursuant
to the [hatchery listing policy].” Id. at *16. Judge Coughenour concluded by asserting that “the
decision to exempt the [hatchery listing policy] from NEPA procedures does no harm to the
shared conservationist purposes of NEPA and the ESA.” Id. at *17.
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seemed contrary to Judge Hogan’s decision in Alsea I, which interpreted the
ESA to foreclose making distinctions between wild and hatchery
populations within a given salmon ESU.194

D. Alsea II: Deferring to NOAA’s Hatchery Policy
While Judge Coughenour was considering the validity of NOAA’s 2005
hatchery policy, Alsea led a coalition of agricultural, forestry, water, and
development interests in a separate challenge to the same policy in the District
Court of Oregon, perhaps hoping to build on their success several years earlier
in Alsea I.195 In Alsea v. Lautenbacher (Alsea II ) the plaintiffs challenged
NOAA’s decision to list sixteen salmon ESUs as well as NOAA’s protective
regulations for salmon populations listed as threatened.196 They claimed that,
under Judge Hogan’s decision in Alsea I, NOAA lacked statutory authority to
distinguish between populations of hatchery and wild salmon populations
within the same ESU in listing species and in promulgating 4(d) protective
regulations.197
Judge Hogan, somewhat surprisingly given his Alsea I decision (where he
interpreted what might have been legislative ambiguity into administrative
prohibition),198 noted that the ESA did not specify how NOAA should conduct
the status review.199 With no statutory prohibition against making distinctions
among populations within salmon ESUs at the status review stage, and no
allegations that NOAA improperly excluded any hatchery populations from
listed ESUs, Hogan upheld the agency’s hatchery listing policy, even though it
authorized differential treatment of populations within an ESU.200 Judge
Hogan was apparently unwilling to extend the implications of his Alsea I
opinion to impose an administrative straightjacket on the ESA listing process.
The environmentalists also brought identical ESA claims in both challenges. Id. at *9.
Because Judge Coughenour issued his final order in both opinions contemporaneously and the
administrative record in Trout Unlimited I was more complete, he elected to consider the ESA
claims only in Trout Unlimited I. Id.
194 See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. Judge Coughenour recognized the
apparent conflict, anticipating “the happy result of instigating needed appellate review.” Trout
Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036, at *7.
195 See supra notes 156–65 and accompanying text; see also Complaint at 1, Alsea II, 2007 WL
2344927 (D.Or. Aug 14, 2007) (filed on May 1, 2006) (providing a full list of Alsea’s co-plaintiffs).
196 Alsea II, 2007 WL 2344927, at *1. Alsea pointed to section 4(d) of the ESA, which directs
the Secretary to issue regulations for the conservation of threatened species, which may include
regulated taking “in the extraordinary case where population pressures within a given
ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved.” Id. at *6 (quoting the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2000)).
197 Id. at *5, *6. Alsea further claimed that NOAA could not include salmon that do not
interbreed in listed populations. Id. at *6.
198 Hogan interpreted the statutory definition of “species,” which includes “subspecies . . .
and any distinct population segment . . . .” to prohibit listing distinctions below distinct
population segments. Alsea I, 161 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1162 (D.Or. 2001) (emphasis removed).
199 See ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring status review determinations but
declining to specify how they should be conducted). The hatchery listing policy specifically
called for status review determinations. Hatchery Listing Policy, supra note 131, at 37,215.
200 Alsea II, 2007 WL 2344927, at *5 (noting that “Congress did not specify how [NOAA]
should conduct a species review”).
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Judge Hogan also sustained NOAA’s 4(d) regulation allowing the taking
of most hatchery fish—but not wild fish—in a threatened ESU because, he
ruled, the ESA does not require equal treatment of wild and hatchery fish.201
He rejected Alsea’s contention that disparate treatment in taking regulations
was inconsistent with the ESA’s definition of conservation, which limits
regulated takings to “extraordinary case[s],”202 noting that the ESA does not
even prohibit the taking of threatened species, and giving deference to
NOAA’s reasonable interpretation of statutory ambiguities.203
Finally, Judge Hogan rejected Alsea’s contention that NOAA’s ESUs
were over-inclusive because they included salmon populations that do not in
fact interbreed, as they spawn at different times and at different places.204
Ruling that the term “distinct population segment” was ambiguous, Judge
Hogan deferred to NOAA’s interpretation of the “reproductive isolation”
component of DPS, which considered genetic factors, stray rates,
recolonization rates, and other criteria, in addition to actual reproduction.205
He observed that if Alsea’s view of the ESA prevailed, requiring actual
interbreeding to be within a DPS, the ESA would forbid U.S. protection of
imperiled species that were abundant elsewhere in the world, which was
something the ESA’s drafters clearly authorized.206 Judge Hogan therefore
ruled that the hatchery listing policy’s criteria for inclusion of salmon
populations was “within permissible limits under the ESA.”207
Thus, in August 2007—less than nine weeks after the Western District
of Washington set aside the hatchery listing policy and the downlisting of
Upper Columbia steelhead as contrary to the ESA—the District of Oregon
upheld the policy and declined to set aside other NOAA listing decisions.208
It therefore appeared that NOAA’s hatchery policy was operative in Oregon
but not in western Washington.

E. Implications of the District Court Hatchery Salmon Decisions
The Alsea I, Trout Unlimited I, and Alsea II decisions can be interpreted
to be consistent with each other. Alsea I ruled that NOAA lacked authority to
make listing decisions below the ESU level, although it did not suggest that
201 Id. at *6 (“Plaintiffs’ authority does not require [NOAA] to treat natural populations and
hatchery stocks equally.”) On the NOAA regulation protecting fish with intact adipose fins but
authorizing takes of fish with clipped fins, see supra note 178.
202 Alsea II, 2007 WL 2344927, at *6. See ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2000) (authorizing
regulated takings “in the extraordinary case where population pressure within a given
ecosystem cannot be otherwise relieved”).
203 Alsea II, 2007 WL 2344927, at *6 (noting that section 4(d) of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d)
(2000), does not prohibit the taking of threatened species).
204 See id. at *6 (noting that, for example, the Lower Columbia River chinook ESU contains
31 separate populations and includes both spring and fall spawners in an area over 130 miles
long and 120 miles wide).
205 Id. at *7.
206 Id. (citing, inter alia, Alsea I, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1162 n.3 (D.Or. 2001), quoting S. REP.
NO. 96-151, on the need to protect imperiled U.S. species, even if they are abundant elsewhere).
207 Alsea II, 2007 WL 2344927, at *7.
208 Id.
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hatchery and wild fish had to be included in the same ESU.209 Trout
Unlimited I held that the ESA’s overarching policy of protecting and
promoting wild fish and their habitats prevented NOAA from applying its
hatchery listing policy because it allowed the abundance of hatchery fish to
affect listing decisions about wild fish.210 Alsea II rejected an attempt to
restrict NOAA’s discretion to make distinctions between wild and hatchery
fish in status reviews concerning listing decisions and in promulgating 4(d)
protective regulations.211 There are no obvious inconsistencies with these
results, but they reflect an apparently dichotomous perspective on the role of
hatchery salmon under the ESA.
Judge Coughenour recognized that the results in Alsea I and Trout
Unlimited I were in conflict.212 Moreover, many of the assumptions underlying
those two decisions are diametrically opposed: the Hogan opinion interpreted
the ESA to foreclose differential treatment to wild and hatchery populations
included within the same ESU,213 but the Coughenour opinion struck down
NOAA’s hatchery policy because it lumped together wild and hatchery fish,
and therefore was inconsistent with the ESA’s overriding goal of protecting
wild fish and their habitats.214 Judge Coughenour questioned Judge Hogan’s
interpretation of the only case on which he relied in Alsea I. 215 Judge Hogan, in
Alsea II, expressly pointed to the lack of deference that Judge Coughenour
gave to NOAA’s hatchery policy.216 Judge Coughenour referred to the result of
Judge Hogan’s Alsea I opinion as “odd.”217 Coughenour called upon the Ninth
Circuit to resolve these issues.218 An even more obvious conflict concerns
Trout Unlimited I’ s striking down the same hatchery policy which the Alsea II
decision affirmed.219 Ninth Circuit review seems on the horizon, as both NOAA
and the Washington State Farm Bureau, Idaho Water Users Association,
Coalition for Idaho Water, and the Building Industry Association of
Washington have filed notices of appeal of Judge Coughenour’s Trout
Unlimited I ruling.220
209

See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 182–94 and accompanying text.
211 See supra notes 199–208 and accompanying text.
212 Trout Unlimited I, No. CV06-0483-JCC, 2007 WL 1795036, at *7 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2007)
(“To the extent that this Court’s order can be read to conflict with Alsea, perhaps this will have
210

the happy result of instigating needed appellate review.”).
213 See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 186 & 191 and accompanying text.
215 Trout Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036, at *7 n.7 (“Southwest Center for Biological Diversity
v. Babbitt does not appear to support the point for which it is cited in the [Alsea I] decision.”).
216 Alsea II, No. 06-6093-HO, 2007 WL 2344927, at *5 (D.Or. Aug. 14, 2007) (“Declining to
apply deferential . . . review, [Judge Coughenour] recently held unlawful and set aside the
Hatchery Policy . . . .”).
217 Trout Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036, at *22 (“[T]he inclusion of hatchery fish alongside
natural fish in a given ESU, and listing the entire ESU as required by Alsea I, when status
determinations are ultimately to be made with reference to the health of the natural population
alone, strikes the Court as odd.”).
218 Id. at *7.
219 Id. at *20; Alsea II, 2007 WL 2344927, at *5.
220 Trout Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036, appeal docketed, No. 07-35750 (9th Cir. Sept. 10,
2007).
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When resolving these inconsistencies, the Ninth Circuit should also
consider a significant law-and-science issue. In Alsea I, Judge Hogan
announced that wild and hatchery fish in the Oregon Coast coho ESU were
“genetically identical,”221 a declaration that seems to be without scientific
support.222 On the other hand, Judge Coughenour concluded that “[i]t is
clear that hatchery fish have important differences from wild fish.”223
Judge Hogan did not repeat his claim of genetic similarity in Alsea II.
Moreover, in that decision he accepted NOAA’s distinction between
hatchery and wild fish, quoting language from the hatchery listing policy
and from NOAA’s listing rule explaining the distinctions.224 Further, he
concluded that “the ESA does not require that protective regulations treat
natural populations and hatchery stocks equally.”225 Thus, despite his
Alsea I pronouncement, Judge Hogan’s Alsea II decision accepted NOAA’s
determination that there were important differences between wild and
hatchery fish, recognition that will defeat most of the aspirations of the
Alsea plaintiffs, who were aiming to dismantle ESA salmon-based
regulation.226
On the other hand, in Trout Unlimited I, Judge Coughenour enjoined
NOAA’s 2005 hatchery policy as contrary to ESA’s “central purpose . . . to
promote and conserve naturally self-sustaining populations.”227 Judge
Hogan did not recognize this overriding ESA policy in either Alsea I or
Alsea II. Thus, he was able to uphold NOAA’s hatchery policy in Alsea II,
while Judge Coughenour struck it down.228 At the least, the Ninth Circuit
must resolve this conflict—even if it is possible to interpret all district
court decisions on the role of hatchery salmon in ESA implementation as

221
222

Alsea I, 161 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1163 (D. Or. 2001).
See Trout Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036, at *3 (stating that “[s]cientific consensus is that

there remain behavioral, genetic, and phenotypic difference between hatchery and natural
fish.”). Due to conditions in fish hatcheries, hatchery salmon are subjected to unnatural
environmental pressures, which leads to artificial selection and domestication. “[H]atchery fish
show less efficient foraging ability, increased aggression, lower territorial fidelity, a preference
for surface habitat . . . and a tendency to approach predators.” Additionally, hatchery
populations typically have decreased breading success compared to wild populations. Id. at *2–
*3.
223 Trout Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036, at *22.
224 Alsea II, 2007 WL 2344927, at *5 (“Not all hatchery stocks considered to be part of listed
ESUs are of equal value for use in conservation and recovery . . . and these hatchery fish could
fulfill other purposes . . . while preserving all future recovery options”); id. at *3 (“[H]atchery
fish within the ESU can positively affect the overall status of the ESU . . . . Conversely, a
hatchery program . . . can affect a listing determination by reducing adaptive genetic diversity of
the ESU, and by reducing the reproductive fitness and productivity of the ESU.”).
225 Id. at *1.
226 Pacific Legal Foundation—an organization “dedicated to property rights, limited
government, and a balanced approach to environmental protection”—represented the Alsea
plaintiffs, whom it referred to as “farmers, property owners, and fishing families who face
stringent restrictions because of unnecessary federal listing of salmon.” Press Release, Pacific
Legal Foundation, PLF Vows Appeal of Salmon Ruling So That All Fish Get Counted (Aug. 15,
2007), available at http://www.pacificlegal.org/?mvcTask=pressReleases&id=825.
227 Trout Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036, at *20; see supra note 191 and accompanying text.
228 Alsea II, 2007 WL 2344927, at *5; Trout Unlimited I, 2007 WL 1795036, at *20.
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consistent with each other—because NOAA’s hatchery listing policy must
either apply in both Oregon and western Washington or in neither
jurisdiction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the pace of events, following Northwest salmon litigation closely
is obviously more than can be attempted in a law journal.229 But the cases
surveyed in this update reflect several persistent themes: 1) the agencies
charged with salmon restoration are not interested in making the Columbia
River safer habitat for migrating salmon if the tradeoff is lost hydropower
revenues; 2) the development agencies opposed to meaningful salmon
restoration are quite powerful, persistent, and duplicitous; and 3) the courts
will usually, but not invariably, defer to the agencies’ determinations. In fact,
these decisions reveal a clear trend toward skeptical judicial review. Given
the sorry track record of agencies like NOAA and BPA over the last quartercentury,230 the advent of skeptical judicial review must be considered a
therapeutic development.
By affirming Judge Redden in NWF v. NMFS,231 the Ninth Circuit gave
its imprimatur to his continued oversight of ESA implementation in the
context of Columbia Basin salmon. Like Judge Boldt thirty years ago
concerning the implementation of Indian treaty fishing rights,232 Judge
Redden has a lonely but critical job; the agencies responsible for designing
and implementing the BiOp on Columbia Basin hydroelectric operations

229 As evidence of the statement in the text, on October 9, 2007, while this article was in
press, Judge Garr King of the Oregon District Court accepted U.S. Magistrate Janice Stewart’s
recommendations that struck down the delisting of Oregon Coast coho, adding another chapter
to the long-running controversy over ESA protection of Oregon Coast coho. Trout Unlimited III,
CV-06-1493-ST, 2007 WL 2973568, at *1 (D.Or. Oct. 5, 2007). See, e.g., supra notes 157–65
(discussing Alsea I and its effect on the Oregon coho listing); supra note 175 (discussing
NOAA’s delisting of Oregon coho); supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text (discussing how
Alsea I led to Alsea II ) ; Laura Hartt, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations v.

NMFS: A Case Study on Successes and Failures in Challenging Logging Activities with Adverse
Cumulative Effects on Fish and Wildlife, 32 ENVTL. L. 671, 681 & n.75 (2002) (discussing NOAA’s
listing, delisting, and relisting as threatened the Oregon Coast ESU of coho); id. at 715 n.410
(discussing the role Alsea I played in NOAA’s delisting of the Oregon Coast coho). In his
original opinion Judge Stewart concluded that NOAA’s delisting decision, which was based in
part on Oregon’s novel theory that coho are inherently resilient at low population levels and
therefore did not require ESA protection, did not reflect best available science. Trout Unlimited
v. Lohn, CV-06-1493-ST, slip op. at 35–50 (D. Or., July 13, 2007) [hereinafter Trout Unlimited IV ],
available
at
http://www.earthjustice.org/library/legal_docs/court-decision-to-restore-cohosalmon-protections.pdf (quoting, at 36, NOAA scientists who said that the state’s theory “simply
does not pass the red face test—too much theoretical and empirical data suggest otherwise for
a wide variety of species”). The court gave NOAA 60 days to reconsider its delisting decision. Id.
at 62–63.
230 See generally supra note 2; Michael C. Blumm & Greg D. Corbin, Salmon and the
Endangered Species Act: Lessons From the Columbia Basin, 74 WASH. L. REV. 519 (1999).
231 See supra notes 18–55 and accompanying text.
232 SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 10, at 80–86 (discussing the Boldt decision and its
aftermath).
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seem as incapable of producing an effective salmon restoration blueprint as
the state of Washington was of producing equitable salmon harvests in the
1970s. The Ninth Circuit’s NWF decision should signal to agencies like
NOAA and BPA that the legal legerdemain and analytical sleights of hand
that characterized the 2004 BiOp233 will not substitute for better in-river
migration conditions which are possible only from substantial operational
changes. Judge Redden will not be easily deceived.
In the NEDC v. BPA, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow BPA to defund
the Fish Passage Center, an indispensable source of critical information
about the science of salmon migration.234 Although perhaps not as dramatic
as the Ninth Circuit’s affirmance of Judge Redden’s rejection of the NOAA
BiOp, this case may have just as long-lasting significance. That is, if the Fish
Passage Center is maintained by the Northwest Conservation and Power
Council in its forthcoming amendments to the Columbia Basin Fish and
Wildlife Program.235
Also flying somewhat under the radar is the Golden Northwest
Aluminum case, in which the Ninth Circuit ruled that BPA had failed to
include in its proposed wholesale electric rates sufficient revenues to carry
out all its fish and wildlife responsibilities.236 This is a significant result,
particularly in light of the deference courts historically have given to BPA
rate decisions.237 Perhaps the same mistrust underlying both Judge Redden’s
decision and the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in NWF v. NMFS and NEDC v.
BPA accounts for the Golden Northwest Aluminum result. If so, BPA surely
earned that distrust, given its shallow reasoning for underfunding fish and
wildlife.238 Perhaps of even more long-term significance is the participation
of Columbia Basin tribes in BPA’s rate case, a complex administrative
proceeding with high transaction costs. If the tribes intend to be repeat
players in rate cases the ramifications could be quite significant. Since the
participants in those proceedings traditionally have been almost exclusively
utilities and BPA this is hardly a recipe for sufficient funding of fish and
wildlife measures.
Finally, the recent district court decisions in the hatchery fish cases—
Trout Unlimited I and Alsea Valley II—clarified that wild salmon is the
priority in ESA restoration.239 Some may have thought that Alsea I called that
priority into question by rejecting NOAA’s attempt to distinguish between
wild and hatchery salmon within the same ESU,240 but Trout Unlimited
invoked ESA’s wild fish preference to strike down both NOAA’s hatchery
233 See supra Part II (describing NOAA’s exclusion from the BiOp of so-called nondiscretionary actions, degraded baseline conditions, and prospects of salmon recovery).
234 See supra Part III.A (describing how the court held BPA had violated both the
Constitution and the APA by unlawfully defunding the FPC).
235 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 117–26 and accompanying text.
237 See cases cited supra note 124.
238 See supra notes 111–16 and accompanying text.
239 See supra Parts V.C–D.
240 See supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text (explaining the basis for Judge Hogan’s
determination in Alsea I that wild and natural coho are genetically identical).
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fish policy and an ESA downlisting.241 This result is of considerable regional
importance, since flooding the Columbia Basin with hatchery fish has been
the prevailing policy for generations,242 and has in fact been an integral
component of operating Columbia Basin dams without paying close
attention to salmon survival for three-quarters of a century.243
Alsea II must have been a considerable disappointment to its plaintiffs,
since its message was that the court would defer to NOAA’s hatchery policy
use of status reviews to make the kind of distinctions between wild and
hatchery fish that seemed foreclosed by Alsea I.244 No such administrative
deference characterized Trout Unlimited I, 245 Judge Redden’s review of the
NOAA BiOp,246 or the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in NWF v. NMFS, NEDC v
BPA, and Golden Northwest Aluminum 247 for that matter. If the Ninth
Circuit decides to resolve the tension between Alsea II and Trout
Unlimited I,248 it will almost certainly address the deference issue. But
whether or not NOAA’s hatchery policy should receive judicial deference,
the other decisions surveyed in this Article indicate that salmon law in 2007
has been characterized not by deference but by judicial skepticism. The
salmon are assuredly the better for this mistrust.249

241

See supra Part V.C.
See SACRIFICING THE SALMON, supra note 10, at 109.
243 Id. at 87–88.
244 Compare supra notes 158–65 and accompanying text (discussing Alsea I ) with Part V.D.
(discussing Alsea II ).
245 See supra Part V.C.
246 See Practicing Deception, supra note 2, at 775.
247 See supra notes 18–55 and accompanying text (discussing NWF v. NMFS ); Part III.A.
(discussing NEDC ); and supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text (discussing Golden
Northwest Aluminum).
248 While there is significant tension between the two decisions, see supra notes 212–19 and
accompanying text, they are not actually in conflict with each other, see supra notes 209–11 and
242

accompanying text.
249 Also benefiting the salmon is another district court decision, by Judge Anthony Gonzalez
of the Western District of Washington, ruling that implied in the 19th century Indian treaties
that promised the tribes “the right of taking fish in common with [settlers]” was the right to
have the salmon protected against state-constructed and maintained road culverts, which block
access to habitat. United States v. Washington, No. CV-9213RSM, 2007 WL 2437166, at *10 (W.D.
Wash. Aug 22, 2007). Professor Blumm is at work on an article about this decision and its
significance.
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